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I. INTRODUCTION
State trademark registration laws fly under the radar. All fifty
states have a state trademark registration system that operates in
parallel with—or more accurately, beneath—the federal
registration system.1 In all but one state, a state registration is
needed to support a state statutory claim of trademark
infringement, but these statutory claims coexist with parallel state
common law trademark rights in the vast majority of states. This
Article examines the role and substantive protection of the several
states’ registration systems by a comparative analysis with the roles
of and substantive protections afforded by state common law, state
unfair competition law, and federal statutory law. My focus is on
the judicial enforcement of trademark rights through civil
litigation, but I also address the effect an individual state
registration may have on a second user’s search and trademark
selection process. The heart of my inquiry is whether state
registrations have real, effective value (as opposed to stated or
theoretical value) for individual owners. A secondary analysis I
pursue includes the systemic costs and benefits of state registration
schemes at both the state and federal levels.
The analysis in this article demonstrates that state trademark
registrations do not add significant value for most trademark
owners when compared to other civil enforcement options
available. Under the law of forty-five states, registrations provide
registrants with no significant, enforceable substantive rights
beyond those awarded under state common law or under the
federal statute protecting unregistered common law trademarks.
In five states certain substantive rights can accrue to an owner
through state registration, although those rights are limited by
1 The federal scheme does not preempt state trademark law. The Lanham Act does not
contain a specific preemption provision of the type found in federal copyright law, see 17
U.S.C. § 301 (2006), but it does contain some limited preemptive language related to
conflict preemption—when application of state law would conflict with full recognition of
federally granted rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“The intent of this chapter is to regulate
commerce within the control of Congress . . . [and] to protect registered marks used in
such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation”); see also Spartan
Food Sys., Inc. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1284 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing “the Lanham
Act’s limited preemption of state law”); John T. Cross, The Role of the States in United States
Trademark Law, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 485, 499–506 (2011) (examining the limited
preemption of state trademark law under current federal law and proposing that Congress
expressly preempt a broader range of state trademark and unfair competition law).
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competing rights held by certain common law owners or federal
registrants. Further, registrants in the forty-five low-value states2
may rely on these almost-to-completely valueless state registrations
to their very great detriment, which can seriously disadvantage a
legally unsophisticated trademark owner. Both high-value and
low-value state registrations create unnecessary complications in
the web of state and federal trademark rights and impose
unwarranted costs upon new market entrants. In addition, most
state registration systems (both high- and low-value) almost
certainly demand more public dollars than the system returns to
the state in the form of either private or public benefit. The
practical value of state registrations is so low, as a whole, that the
costs outweigh the benefits. As a result, I advocate for the
complete abolition of all current state trademark registration
systems.
In support of my argument that trademark law and
trademark owners, as well as the public, would be better served by
the abolition of state trademark registrations than by their
perpetuation, this Article proceeds as follows. First, I briefly survey
the history and interaction of state and federal trademark law and
review the major statutory benefits of federal trademark
registrations. Second, I analyze and critique the trademark
statutes of all fifty states, with an emphasis on what rights, if any, a
state registration provides that are not otherwise available under
state common law or the Lanham Act. Third, I explain some of
the private and public costs of state trademark registrations. The
analysis leads to my conclusion, set forth in the final portion of the
article, that trademark owners and the trademark “universe” in the
United States would be better off if states abolished their current
registration systems.
II. THE NATURE AND INTERACTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL
TRADEMARK LAW
A. The Role of Common Law
Although the Lanham Act, the source of federal trademark
law, has dominated trademark protection and litigation for at least
forty years, trademarks were not always statutory creatures, nor
were they initially federal in nature. Trademark protection
developed in the United States from state common law.3 All states

2
3

The references to “low-value” and “high-value” are explained in Part III.A–B, infra.
For a more general overview of the history of trademark law, several sources are
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continue to provide some means of enforcing common law rights;4
forty-nine states also have a trademark cause of action requiring
state registration of the mark. In these states, the statutory rules
governing both validity and enforcement of state-registered rights
arise from common law principles.
Courts often repeat the maxim that a registration does not
create trademark rights, but only recognizes rights that must
ultimately be acquired through use.5 This is true in that
registration alone does not create enforceable rights, yet the
benefits available under federal law, particularly the expansion of
rights beyond the area of use, strongly incentivize the pursuit of
federal registration.6 In addition to registration incentives, the
Lanham Act provides statutory causes of action to enforce
unregistered, or common law rights offensively and recognizes the
existence of those rights as a defensive matter.7 Thus common law
principles have not faded away in federal law any more than in
state law, although federal registration has become the ideal for
trademark owners, and federal trademark causes of action are now
entirely statutory.8 Rights created and recognized through the
application of common law principles, which have developed and
evolved over time,9 retain significant value at both the state and
federal levels.
The owner of unregistered, or common law trademark rights
available. See, e.g., FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS (1925); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 5:1–:3 (4th ed. 2008), and sources cited therein; Edward S.
Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trademarks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 29 (1910); see also The
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
4 See infra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., 454 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Registration
does not create a mark or confer ownership; only use in the market-place can establish a
mark.”). This issue, which continues to be discussed in federal cases, appears to have also
arisen over a century ago in the state context. In 1900, the writer of a trademark treatise
noted that, with one exception (a California decision whose effect was soon nullified by
state statute), no court in the United States had ever held that trademark rights were
created by registration, as opposed to use. See JAMES L. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
TRADE INCLUDING TRADE-MARKS, TRADE SECRETS, AND GOOD-WILL 40 (1900).
6 See infra Part II.B.1–4.
7 See infra Part II.B.3 & Part II.B.5.
8 See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (holding that “[t]here
is no federal general common law,” meaning that state law must be applied to a dispute
unless the matter is governed by the federal Constitution or federal statutory law); Ruhlin
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205 (1938) (holding that the Erie “doctrine applies
though the question of construction arises not in an action at law, but in a suit in equity”).
For an extended discussion of the impact of Erie on trademark and unfair competition
law, see Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair
Competition, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 955 (1942).
9 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 560–82, 592–615 (2006); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1858–73, 1896–1912
(2007).
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seeking to enforce its rights through litigation based on either
state or federal law must, as a preliminary matter, prove that it has
acquired and continues to hold valid trademark rights.10 In
general, both state and federal law recognize the existence of
protectable trademark rights following use by a person of a
trademark in the ordinary course of that person’s offering of
goods and services to members of the public.11 Proving validity
requires evidence of the following: dates of first use of the mark,
and perhaps the manner and frequency of use of the mark; which
persons or entities use the mark (if the mark is used by licensees
or other related entities); inherent or acquired distinctiveness of
the mark; and other facts relevant to validity and ownership.12 If
the court recognizes valid rights in a mark, it will also determine—
possibly after obtaining additional evidence—the scope of goods
and services covered by the trademark rights and the geographic
scope of the rights, both based on the range of actual use and
reputation garnered in the marketplace.13 These scope-related
determinations feed into the analysis of the ultimate liability
question of consumer confusion. The owner of common law
rights may only hold rights in certain geographic areas, which may
be small or large depending on the zone of market penetration
established by the nature and extent of the owner’s use and the
subsequent spread of its reputation.14
In most instances, if valid rights are proved, the “likelihood of
10 See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. American Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 267–68,
272 (4th Cir. 2003).
The fact that federal trademark causes of action are entirely statutory does not mean that
“common law” has vanished from federal trademark law. To the contrary, as discussed
throughout this Article, federal statutory claims derive much of their substance from
judge-made or common law. The common law in question is not the law of any particular
state but is instead an amalgam of principles derived, developed, and evolved over many
years within both federal and state case law. Cf. Cross, supra note 1, at 512–14 (arguing
that federal trademark law is built on a foundation of federal common law rather than on
state common law).
11 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 9 (defining a trademark), 18
(discussing use) (1995).
12 See, e.g., Emergency One, 332 F.3d at 267–70; Allard Enters., Inc. v. Advanced
Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564, 572-75 (6th Cir. 2001); Sengoku Works, Ltd. v.
RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1996); First Bank v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 84
F.3d 1040, 1044–46 (8th Cir. 1996).
13 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 19. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 24:1–:62
(scope of goods and services), §§ 26:1–:30 (geographic scope).
14 See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415–16 (1916) (“Into
whatever markets the use of a trademark has extended, or its meaning has become
known, there will the manufacturer or trader whose trade is pirated by an infringing use
be entitled to protection and redress.”); Peaches Entm’t Corp. v. Entm’t Repertoire
Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 690, 693–95 (5th Cir. 1995) (relying on Hanover Star Milling to
support its holding that the trade area for an unregistered mark extends to the “zone of
reputation,” which is a zone established through evidence of reputation, advertising, and
sales, but not the outer reach of advertising alone).
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confusion” test governs the scope of another person’s liabilitycreating activities.15 The likelihood of confusion test requires the
decision-maker to determine, based on the scope of the owner’s
trademark rights and the nature of the accused infringer’s use of
the same or similar mark, whether confusion on the part of actual
or potential consumers is likely to occur as to the source of goods
or services, or as to the sponsorship or affiliation of the trademark
owner (or its goods or services) with the accused infringer (or its
goods or services).16
Common law rights form the backbone of state trademark
law. State common law actions, as well as statutory unfair
competition actions based upon common law rights, remain active
sources of trademark-related claims in modern litigation
practice—particularly when added to a federal claim of
infringement17—although the current means of accessing the
rights vary from state to state. Some states retain an enforceable
common law action specifically denominated by the courts as a
“trademark” claim.18 In other states, protection for unregistered
15 See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 23:1; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 20. Federal
law also provides claims for dilution and cybersquatting, but here I am focusing on more
traditional common law claims and rights. In addition to confusion-type infringement,
some states may recognize a common law claim for dilution of trademark rights; however,
most states recognize dilution only under statutory law. See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ,
TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 17–22 (2002);
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:76.
16 See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 23:1-:9; RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 20–21.
17 Reported judicial decisions reflect a pleading practice by which trademark plaintiffs
generally lead with a claim under federal law, for infringement of either a registered mark
or an unregistered one, but also include state law claims for common law trademark
infringement and unfair competition. This approach means that many more state claims
are pleaded than are decided, in light of the general agreement in the case law that a
decision on the federal infringement claims also disposes of all other claims. The
dominance of federal law has thus led to a lack of recent case law clearly interpreting and
applying state trademark law.
18 See, e.g., Horseshoe Bay Resort Sales Co. v. Lake Lyndon B. Johnson Improvement
Corp., 53 S.W.3d 799 (Tex. App. 2001) (recognizing claim for common law trademark
infringement under Texas law).
All but a handful of states (Alaska, Louisiana, and New Mexico), expressly preserve
common law trademark rights by means of a savings clause within the state statutory
trademark scheme. ALA. CODE § 8-12-19 (LexisNexis 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441452 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-216 (2001); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14259 (West
2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11k (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3315
(2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.161 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-452 (2009); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 482-53 (LEXIS through 2010-2011 Legis. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-516
(2003); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1036/80 (West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-1-15
(LexisNexis 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.116 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-217
(Supp. 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.611 (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1532 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 1-402 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 110H, § 16 (West Supp. 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 429.44 (West 2001);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.30 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-31 (West through 2010
amendments); MO. ANN. STAT. § 417.066 (West Supp. 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-12336 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-143 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 600.440 (2007); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 350-A:14 (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:3-113.13 (West 2001); N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-o (Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-13 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §
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trademarks falls within a more general claim for “unfair
competition” or “unfair trade practices.”19
B. The Dominance of Federal Law
The “federalization” of trademark rights had a rocky start in

47-22-13 (Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1329.67 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 78, § 78-33 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.115(1) (West 2011); 54 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1126 (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-1 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-151180 (Supp. 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-6-27 (LexisNexis 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §
47-25-516 (2001); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.27(a) (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 70-3a-104 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2532 (2006); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 59.1-92.15 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.900 (West, Westlaw through 2011
Legislation); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-2-16 (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 132.25
(2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-113 (2003).
In 1996, Alaska repealed the statutory provision expressly saving common law
trademark rights and causes of action. It is not entirely clear whether the elimination of
the provision, which leaves the statutory scheme silent as to common law rights, actually
eliminated all common law causes of action for trademark infringement as a practical
matter, since I can find no legislative history or subsequent case law addressing the issue.
But in any event, common law trademark rights remain protected in Alaska through a
relationship to the state’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, ALASKA
STAT. § 45.50.471 (2008). The Supreme Court of Alaska has since held it to be an unfair
trade practice to use another person’s common law trademark in a way that is likely to
mislead the public as to source, sponsorship, or approval. Alderman v. Iditarod Props., 32
P.3d 373, 380-92 (Alaska 2001).
Louisiana does not recognize state “common law” rights as such because, among
other reasons, Louisiana law has developed and continues to exist within the civil law
tradition (making it unique among the several states). The Louisiana Supreme Court has
ruled, however, that Louisiana law includes equity-based trademark rights that track the
common law trademark rights recognized in the rest of the country and that the creation
of its state statutory scheme did not extinguish or abridge the equity-based trademark
protections that exist outside the statutory scheme. See Gulf Coast Bank v. Gulf Coast
Bank & Trust Co., 652 So.2d 1306, 1311-12 (La. 1995) (“It has . . . been long held that the
protection of trademarks and trade names under the law of unfair competition is based
on the proprietary interest one has in the mark or name, and such protection is based on
equity and does not require statutory provisions.”).
At least one court in New Mexico, a federal district court, has opined that the New
Mexico Legislature may have purposely “extinguish[ed] the common-law cause of action
for trademark infringement, if indeed New Mexico has ever adopted it.” Guidance
Endodontics, L.L.C. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 708 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1249-50 (D.N.M. 2010).
This statement was based on the fact that before 1997, the state trademark act contained a
common law savings clause, but a 1997 recodification of trademark law omitted the
clause. See id; cf. S & S Invs., Inc. v. Hooper Enters., Ltd., 862 P.2d 1252, 1254 (N.M. 1993)
(relying on the then-existing common law savings provision to limit rights in a registered
mark).
19 Unfair competition claims based on infringement of a common law mark arise from the
common law in some states and in other states have also been recognized to fall within the
scope of a statutory unfair trade practices act. See, e.g., Alderman, 32 P.3d at 380–92; Future
Prof’ls, Inc. v. Darby, 470 S.E.2d 644, 646 (Ga. 1996) (establishing that the Georgia
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act “entitles a person to the protection of a trade
name when another person’s use of a similar name causes likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or
services.”) (internal quotations omitted); Gulf Coast Bank, 652 So.2d at 1311–12
(recognizing proprietary rights in unregistered marks as falling within equity-based
protection against unfair competition). Some states have overlapping protection. See, e.g,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, § 53 (placing passing off within the scope of the unfair practices act)
and § 33 (expressly preserving, within trademark registration statutes, both “right[s]
[and] enforcement of rights in trademarks acquired in good faith at any time at common
law”).
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the late 1800s.20 The Supreme Court declared the first federal
statutory trademark scheme to be unconstitutional in 1879,21 and
the replacement instituted by Congress had a severely limited
scope.22 Federal law gained importance under the 1905 trademark
act, which included provisions for registration of marks used in
interstate commerce, but that act also had significant limits.
Descriptive marks, for example, were not protected.23 Federal law
finally ascended to prominence with the passage of the Lanham
Act in 1946,24 and it assumed its modern, (almost)-allencompassing status in the 1970s simply through increased
practical reliance rather than statutory revision.25 As Professor
Thomas McCarthy observed in a 1981 article:
In the last ten years there has been a veritable explosion of
litigation involving [Lanham Act] Section 43(a). The result of
this trend has not been to effect any change in the substantive
law, for traditional trademark rules are followed in Section
43(a) cases. Rather, the effect has been to shift the locale of
much traditional unfair competition litigation from state courts
to federal courts.26

See Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198 (1870); see also The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82,
92 (1879) (noting that federal trademark law was of recent origin, dating only from 1870).
21 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94, 98–99 (holding the 1870 trademark act
unconstitutional because it fell outside the scope of Congress’s limited authority under
Article I and could not be sustained under the patent and copyright clause of the U.S.
Constitution, in article 1, section 8, clause 8). The 1870 Act did not contain an express
nexus with interstate or other commerce specifically within Congress’s Article I authority.
22 Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502 (1881) (providing for the registration and
protection of marks used in commerce with foreign countries or the Indian territories,
but not covering marks used in interstate commerce), superseded by Pub. L. No. 58-84, 33
Stat. 724 (1905).
23 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, 33 Stat. 724 (1905) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 81–
134), repealed by Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
24 Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). The possibility of registering a descriptive mark through proof of acquired
distinctiveness was a major change that increased the scope of potential federal coverage.
Two other, perhaps more important, changes were the provision of statutory constructive
use and constructive notice within the entire country as of the date of registration. 15
U.S.C. § 1057 (2006) (providing for nationwide constructive use, and thus priority, as of
the date of the filing of the federal application, which date was, until 1988, the date of
registration); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (providing for nationwide constructive notice,
eliminating defenses based on innocent or good faith conduct, as of the date of
registration). A fourth change that increased the power of the federal registration system
was the possibility of “incontestability” of a registration, in certain circumstances,
following five years of ownership. 15 U.S.C. § 1065.
25 Although the power of Lanham Act section 43(a) grew initially through its application
by the courts, which was made possible by its lack of specific limiting language, Congress
later confirmed the breadth of the provision when it revised section 43(a) in 1988.
26 J. Thomas McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law During the
Decade of the 1970s, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 93, 100–01 (1981) [hereinafter McCarthy, Trends]
(citations omitted); see also Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Civil Remedies for Intellectual Property
Invasions: Themes and Variations, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 77 (1992) (“The
20
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Since the 1970s, the role of federal law in shaping trademark
rights has continued to grow.27
The dominance of federal trademark law over state law has
resulted from two forces: (1) the growth of Lanham Act section
43(a), which shifts what would otherwise be common law litigation
to the federal sphere; and (2) the incentives to pursue federal
registration, which are now so significant as to make federal
registration indispensable for any owner making an informed
decision about its trademark rights. A federal registration is the
only rational choice because, among other things, it provides
prima facie evidence of certain matters, it creates nationwide
constructive use as well as nationwide constructive notice, it can
create “incontestable” rights in some circumstances, and an
application seeking these benefits can be filed several years in
advance of use.
1. Evidentiary Benefit
A federal registration certificate for the Principal Register28
serves as prima facie evidence of the matters a plaintiff must prove
metamorphosis of section 43(a) as a resort for unregistered marks has made the federal
forum, and federal law, the dominant backdrop for trademark litigation.”); The United
States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to
USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 377 (1987) (“Federal
trademark registration, Section 43(a), and the engulfing sweep of interstate commerce
have given the law and policy of trademarks a strongly federal cast. The federal courts
now decide, under federal law, all but a few trademark disputes. State trademark law and
state courts are less influential than ever.”).
27 One example of the continued dominance of federal law is the shift in state antidilution statutes that has occurred since 1995, when an anti-dilution provision was added
in section 43(c) of the Lanham Act. Before 1995, when the Lanham Act did not contain
express protection against dilution, the states whose laws contained dilution protection
followed the same basic formula, wherein “likelihood of injury to business reputation or
of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark . . . shall be a ground for injunctive relief
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of
confusion as to the source of goods or services.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (Supp.
2010); accord, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (2003). After 1995, states adding
protection almost always followed the new federal model, and even some states whose laws
had been in the “old-style” revised the relevant statute to fall in line with the federal
provision. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1448.01 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-214
(Supp. 2008). Since 2006, when the federal dilution provision was revised, some states
have adopted dilution provisions based on the current federal statute. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 8-12-17 (LEXIS through 2010 amendments); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14247 (West
2008); see also infra notes 120–121.
28 The above discussion of federal registrations, as well as the remainder of this article,
relates to the effect of a registration on the Principal Register. Registrations on the
Supplemental Register do not possess the same evidentiary or substantive force as those
on the Principal Register. See 15 U.S.C. § 1094 (excluding supplemental registrations
from the advantages of the following sections: 1057(b) (prima facie evidentiary weight),
1057(c) (constructive notice as of the date of application), 1065 (incontestability), 1072
(registration as constructive notice), 1115 (prima facie evidentiary value), 1124
(importation right), 1096 (providing that supplemental registrations may not be used to
stop importations)).
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in order to have standing to assert a claim for infringement:
validity of the mark; the registrant’s ownership of the mark; and
the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in the
U.S. in connection with the goods and services listed in the
certificate.29 The substitution of the registration certificate for
what might otherwise be extensive proof of validity relies on the
standards for registration,30 which incorporate the basic common
law principles of validity, and the federal trademark office’s
examination of each application to ensure conformity with those
standards. The prima facie case created by the certificate is
subject to being rebutted with evidence submitted by the accused
infringer.31 The owner of a federal registration need only put on
specific evidence related to validity, for example, if a defendant
challenges validity through evidence that would call into question
the ownership of valid rights by the registrant, such as
abandonment, generic status of the mark, or the like.32 Without

Section 7(b) of the Lanham Act specifically provides:
A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register provided by
this Act shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and
of the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the
owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in
connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate, subject to any
conditions or limitations stated in the certificate.
15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). Lanham Act section 33(a) essentially restates the prima facie
evidentiary value of a registration and then makes it clear that the registration does not
extinguish legal or equitable defenses or defects that would otherwise be available to
opposing parties. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a).
30 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1052.
31 See, e.g., OBX-Stock, Inc. v. Bicast, Inc., 558 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 2009) (“It is true that
a certificate of registration serves as prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered
mark . . . . But entry on the Principal Register does not shift the burden of persuasion on
validity, merely the burden of production.”); Retail Services, Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g, 364
F.3d 535, 543 (4th Cir. 2004) (“If sufficient evidence of [invalidity] is produced to rebut
the presumption, the presumption is ‘neutralize[d]’ and essentially drops from the case,
although the evidence giving rise to the presumption remains.”); Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne
Corp., 296 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In trademark terms, the registration is not
absolute but subject to rebuttal[,]” and “discharges the plaintiff's original common law
burden of proving validity in an infringement action”); Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp.,
243 F.3d 812, 816, 818 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that the presumption created by the
registration satisfies the burden of proving validity and ownership in the absence of
rebutting evidence).
If a registration has become incontestable through proper filing of an affidavit of
incontestability at least five years after the registration was initially granted, however, then
the registration serves as conclusive evidence of validity, ownership and the registrant’s
right to use the mark in most, but not all, circumstances. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). Certain
affirmative defenses and validity challenges survive incontestability, and the plaintiff
owner of the registration continues to bear the burden of proof on the issue of
infringement, such as proving that the defendant’s activities create a likelihood of
confusion, mistake or deception. Id.; KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression
I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117 (2004).
32 See, e.g., Zobmondo Entm’t, L.L.C. v. Falls Media, L.L.C., 602 F.3d 1108, 1113–14 (9th
Cir. 2010); Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 502 F.3d 504, 513–14 (6th
Cir. 2007); Retail Services, 364 F.3d at 542; Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital
Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 1999).
29
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some quantum of evidence from the defendant on these issues,
the registration certificate provides sufficient proof of rights in
litigation under section 32.33
2. Nationwide Priority
A federal registration also creates nationwide constructive
use, which generates nationwide priority. Under section 7(c) of
the Lanham Act,34 added in 1988, once a mark is registered, the
filing date of the registrant’s application marks the date after
which the registrant obtains nationwide priority35 effective against
most other persons, with the exception of a prior common law
user36 or certain other persons whose federal application predates
the registrant’s own.37 Section 22 of the Lanham Act supplements
section 7(c)’s nationwide constructive-use-based priority with
constructive notice, which dates from registration.38 The date of
registration marks the date after which all other persons, prior
common law users and subsequent junior users alike, are on
constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of rights. Constructive
notice affects the question of a common law user’s good faith in
See cases cited supra note 32.
15 U.S.C. § 1057(c):
Contingent on the registration of a mark on the principal register provided by
this chapter, the filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute
constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect,
on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration
against any other person except for a person whose mark has not been
abandoned and who, prior to such filing:
(1) has used the mark;
(2) has filed an application to register the mark which is pending or has
resulted in registration of the mark; or
(3) has filed a foreign application to register the mark on the basis of which he
or she has acquired a right of priority, and timely files an application under
section 1126 (d) of this title to register the mark which is pending or has
resulted in registration of the mark.
35 Rights based on a federal registration become active as of the date of registration, but
priority determinations are, under the current version of the Lanham Act, thereafter
based on the filing date of the application. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (“Contingent on the
registration of a mark . . . the filing of the application . . . shall constitute constructive use
. . . .”). However, registrations based on applications filed before November 16, 1989 (the
effective date of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, see Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102
Stat. 3935, 3948 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2006)) do not have priority
that dates back to the filing date. Instead, their priority arises from constructive notice,
which is effective as of the date of registration, if registered under the Lanham Act, or the
date of publication of the mark under 15 U.S.C. § 1062(c) if registered under earlier
federal trademark acts, the Act of March 3, 1881 or the Act of February 20, 1905. 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5)(C).
36 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c)(1).
37 A registrant obtains this priority over new common law users but not over persons with
competing rights who can claim priority through an application with a filing date even
earlier than the registrant’s own application filing date. See id. § 1057(c)(2)–(3).
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (“Registration of a mark on the principal register provided by this
chapter or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, shall be
constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership thereof.”).
33
34
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adopting a mark or expanding its use, and under the prevailing
case law eliminates that good faith and can bar acquisition of valid
rights after the date of registration.39 The combined effect of
nationwide constructive notice and priority means that federally
registered rights have radically altered the scope of rights
compared to the common law governing priority disputes.40
3. Effect on Common Law Defenses
Initially, a federally registered mark is subject to any legal or
equitable defense available from common law or statute.41 All of
the possible defenses or defects under the common law need not
be listed here, since not all are relevant to state registrations, but
one relevant common law defense is a claim of prior use.42 In
39 In common law disputes, some courts rule that knowledge of the senior use eliminates a
junior user’s good faith, while others hold that knowledge is not dispositive of the issue.
See, e.g., C.P. Interests, Inc. v. California Pools, Inc. 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2001).
Constructive notice provided under the Lanham Act, however, is considered by courts to
prevent a junior user from validly claiming that its post-registration use was in good faith.
See McCarthy, supra note 3, §§ 26:40, 26:45, 26:53–57.
Despite its universally accepted power, the effect of section 22 constructive notice is
overwhelmed by section 7(c)’s constructive use in all cases where the junior use post-dates
the registrant’s date of filing. Accord MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 26:38. Constructive usebased priority bars acquisition of rights as of filing, and constructive notice at registration
adds nothing in practice. Constructive notice still plays a role, however, in the case of a
common law user that has acquired valid rights before the registrant’s filing date, since
that user’s rights are expressly unaffected by section 7(c). Unlike section 7(c), section 22
contains no exclusions for prior users, and its constructive notice will “freeze” the senior
common law user as of the registration date, although that user was free of the constraints
of the registrant’s constructive use between the filing date and the registration date. See
Allard Enters., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564, 572 (6th Cir. 2001)
(noting that a prior common law user is frozen at registration by operation of constructive
notice).
40 See, e.g., Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968) (refusing to
allow a state registrant whose use predated the federal registration to maintain a
geographic area to which it expanded after the federal registration date, even though it
had no actual notice of the federal registrant’s claim and the federal registrant entered
that state after the expansion). A senior user could attempt to obtain a concurrent
registration for the areas in which the senior user used and was known by the mark before
the junior user’s registration date, but it will not receive any rights to a zone of expansion
beyond the area of use and reputation. See In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 474
n.13 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The registrant will, in many or perhaps most cases, be awarded the
right to use the mark in all areas of the country not reached by the senior user before the
registration date. See, e.g., Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 523–26
(C.C.P.A. 1980).
41 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (“[Registration] shall not preclude another person from proving
any legal or equitable defense or defect, including those set forth in subsection (b) of this
section, which might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered.”); see also
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Common Law and Trade Marks in an Age of Statutes, in THE
COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 331 (Catherine W. Ng, Lionel Bently &
Giuseppina D’Agostino eds., 2010) (explaining and commenting upon the adoption of
the Lanham Act as an overlay on existing common law rights and arguing that continued
judicial development of trademark principles in a common law fashion was intended by
Congress and has been accepted by the Supreme Court in its decisions).
42 See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); see also Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse
than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a “Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 914–24
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defending against a claim made by the owner of a federally
unregistered mark, the alleged infringer argues against its liability
because it is actually the senior user of the mark in the geographic
area in question, and thus possesses priority in the mark in that
area. The defense can apply even if the alleged infringer is,
generally speaking, the junior user of the mark, as long as it is
“senior” in the geographic area at issue.43 The common law prior
user defense is limited to remote, good-faith junior users, with the
meaning of the terms “remote” and “good faith” supplied by
reference to the facts of the case and the holdings of prior cases.44
The area in which the common law defense applies incorporates
at least the actual area of use and likely areas to which the user’s
reputation has spread, and in some cases also includes a zone of
expansion.
Before a federal registration becomes “incontestable,” the
common law prior user defense applies, but nationwide priority
and notice preclude further acquisition of use-based rights. After
five years of registration, most federal registrations can attain
“incontestable” status, another important incentive to pursue
federal registration.45 After incontestability, the common law
user’s rights are confined (or perhaps refined) by statute.46 The
(2009) (discussing various recognized defenses to a trademark infringement action).
43 See cases cited supra note 42.
44 See Quicksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 761–62 (9th Cir. 2006).
45 The Lanham Act has, since its creation, contained a provision allowing the owner of a
principal registration to obtain incontestable status for that registration after five years.
The basic requirements for incontestability are that there have been no final decision
adverse to the registrant’s claim of ownership of the mark, that there be no pending
proceeding involving the registration, and that the mark have been in continuous use for
five years in connection with the goods or services listed in the registration and still be in
such use (the affidavit of incontestability can list, and will therefore only apply to, some
but not all of the goods listed in the registration). See 15 U.S.C. § 1065(1)–(3). The term
“incontestable” is actually a bit of an overstatement since, as set forth in both section
33(b) and section 14, an incontestable registration remains contestable in certain limited
circumstances, including when the mark has become the generic name for the goods or
services, or when the mark has been abandoned through non-use. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(3),
1115(b)(1)–(9).
Incontestability eliminates, for example, a challenge to the validity of the mark on
the basis that the mark is merely descriptive and does not possess acquired distinctiveness,
or secondary meaning. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
469 U.S. 189, 196 (1985). Many or perhaps most of the benefits of incontestability, aside
from the effect on common law prior users discussed above, are not relevant to analysis of
state trademark registrations, since only one state’s law provides for an “incontestable”
effect. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., Thrifty Rent-a-Car System, Inc. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831 F.2d 1177, 1181 (1st Cir.
1987) (noting that the “essence of the exception embodied in § 1115(b)(5) [Lanham Act
section 33(b)(5)] is based on common law trademark protection for remote users
established by the Supreme Court in Hanover Star Milling . . . and United Drug”).
Before incontestability, for example, a prior common law user can challenge a
registration on the ground that the registrant cannot demonstrate that its descriptive
mark has acquired distinctiveness. See id. It could also attempt to earn concurrent
registered rights or seek partial cancellation. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1064, 1066.
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third party’s prior use remains available to preserve the third
party’s common law rights in the specific geographic areas in
which actual and continuous use earlier than the registrant’s
priority date can be proved,47 with all other areas of the country
reserved to the registrant.
4. The Intent-to-Use Advantage
Trademark owners also find federal registration appealing
because of the ability to file an intent-to-use application.48 Before
Incontestable status is not valid under section 15 to the extent that the use of the
registered mark would infringe rights acquired under state law, so in certain directly
conflicting circumstances a prior user may continue to have a right to challenge an
otherwise incontestable registration.
47 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5)–(6):
[The] conclusive evidence of the right to use the registered mark [created by
incontestability] . . . shall be subject to the following defenses or defects:
....
(5) That the mark whose use by a party is charged as an infringement was
adopted without knowledge of the registrant’s prior use and has been
continuously used by such party or those in privity with him from a date prior to
(A) the date of constructive use of the mark established pursuant to section
1057(c) of this title,
(B) the registration of the mark under this chapter if the application for
registration is filed before the effective date of the Trademark Law Revision
Act of 1988, or
(C) publication of the registered mark under subsection (c) of section 1062
of this title:
Provided, however, [t]hat this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in
which such continuous prior use is proved; or
(6) That the mark whose use is charged as an infringement was registered and
used prior to the registration under this chapter or publication under
subsection (c) of section 1062 of this title of the registered mark of the
registrant, and not abandoned: Provided, however, [t]hat this defense or defect
shall apply only for the area in which the mark was used prior to such
registration or such publication of the registrant’s mark . . . .
The common law prior use defense might be less restrictive of the prior user’s rights
than the statutory defense, in some situations, because the determination of common law
priority could include, in many jurisdictions, a determination of each party’s area of use as
well as a surrounding zone of natural expansion. In other jurisdictions, it would include
the area of use and reputation, but no zone of expansion. The section 33(b)(5)–(6)
defenses restrict the non-registrant prior user’s priority to the area of use, with no
mention of any zone of reputation or expansion.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has characterized the
common law prior user defense as being more restrictive than the section 33(b)(5)
defense in that the statutory defense does not contain a requirement of remoteness.
Quiksilver, 466 F.3d at 761–62 (distinguishing between the statutory and common law
“innocent use” defenses by finding that the common law defense required remoteness,
while the statutory defense did not); see also Quiksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 360 F. App’x
886, 888 (9th Cir. 2009) (summary order) (confirming the earlier holding regarding
remoteness and also holding that when a federal registrant relies on its common law
rights under section 43(a) rather than its registered rights, the common law defense
requiring remoteness of the junior use applies, rather than the statutory defense which
does not require remoteness).
48 All states require use in commerce within the state before an application to register the
mark may validly be filed. A handful of states do allow for a short-term “reservation” of a
desired mark, which may be filed before use begins. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:213(B)(2) (1993) (providing for a 60-day reservation with two possible 30-day
extensions); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.015 (West, Westlaw through 2011
Legislation)(allowing a 180-day reservation).
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November 16, 1989, federal applications could only be filed on the
basis of prior use of the mark in commerce. As a result, the
registrant’s earliest priority in a mark varied geographically:
common law rights were limited in scope but arose from the date
of use, while nationwide rights arose later, from the date of
registration. Time delays in processing applications meant that
competing common law uses, which would have to be tolerated by
the registrant, could arise before the date of registration in various
locations around the country as long as they were remote from the
registrant’s earlier use. Various other reasons not relevant to the
matter at hand led to the 1988 revision of the Lanham Act to add
a new basis for filing a federal application: the applicant’s bona
fide intent to use the mark in commerce. The 1988 revision to
section 7 to create constructive use from the date of application,
rather than only constructive notice as of the date of registration,
means that intent-to-use applicants can have one date of priority
nationwide,49 and that date can be far earlier than the date of first
use in commerce.50
5. Protection for Unregistered Marks
In addition to creating incentives to apply for federal
registration, the Lanham Act provides a federal cause of action for
the infringement of an unregistered mark. Section 43(a) includes
in its broad language a trademark infringement claim for almost
any trademark owner, whether the mark is registered or only
common law in nature.51 It provides, in relevant part:
49 Even use-based applicants now gain earlier nationwide priority, preceded in some areas
by prior use. These federal registrants do not have a uniform priority date nationwide,
but even they gain nationwide priority earlier under current (post-1989) law than they did
under prior law.
50 Applicants who avail themselves of the intent-to-use basis for filing an application are
given six months (after the date on which the application is allowed for registration) in
which to file proof of use of the mark in commerce, after which the mark may be
registered. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1). Applicants may obtain up to five additional sixmonth extensions of time to file such proof of use by filing formal requests and paying a
prescribed fee. See id. § 1051(d)(2). The total time potentially available for maintaining a
live intent-to-use application before filing the statement of use is thus three years after the
notice of allowance is issued. The notice of allowance is generally issued, at a minimum, a
year or more after the date of filing as a result of the time needed for examination and
publication of the application. An intent-to-use application can, therefore, remain
pending without any actual use in commerce for four (or more) years after the date of
filing.
51 Section 43(a) also provides a cause of action for false advertising, false endorsement
and other related claims. See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping
Giant Is Now Wide Awake, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (1996) [hereinafter McCarthy,
Sleeping Giant] (describing the history of section 43(a), including the 1989 Congressional
codification of the judicial expansion of the scope of the provision); Elizabeth Williams,
Annotation, Standing to Bring False Advertising Claim or Unfair Competition Claim Under §
43(a)(1) of Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)), 124 A.L.R. Fed. 189 (1995) (surveying
the breadth of parties with possible standing under section 43(a)).
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(a) Civil action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin . . . which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person . . . .
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.52

Courts have for some time accepted that this provision allows
the owner of a common law trademark to use federal law to
vindicate its trademark interests.53 The Supreme Court has
confirmed that:
it is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying
unregistered trademarks and that the general principles
qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act
[which governs, inter alia, the issue of distinctiveness, including
inherent and acquired distinctiveness] are for the most part
applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is

The full text of section 43(a)(1) is as follows:
(a) (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which:
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
53 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act:
You’ve Come a Long Way Baby–Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84 (1973) (describing and, in
part, criticizing the scope of section 43(a) as applied by the courts since 1965); McCarthy,
Sleeping Giant, supra note 51; McCarthy, Trends, supra note 26.
Owners of common law marks will potentially need to prove to the court that the mark
has been used in interstate, foreign, or Indian-territory commerce or can be shown to
affect such commerce, as further addressed in Part II.C. See, e.g., Jellibeans, Inc. v.
Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 838–39 (11th Cir. 1983).
52
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entitled to protection under § 43(a).54

C. The Remaining Intrastate Commerce Gap
Despite the “explosion” of federal claims and the dominance
of federal registration under the Lanham Act, federal law does not
provide protection for all potential trademark rights in the United
States—just the vast majority of them. The Lanham Act, which is
based on Congress’s interstate commerce power, leaves to state law
the matter of protecting marks used only in intrastate commerce
and not affecting interstate commerce.55 The Lanham Act
expressly states that its coverage of commerce and use of the term
“commerce” is co-extensive with Congress’s full commerce
power.56 As the interstate commerce doctrine has broadened over
the past seventy-five years, the scope of federal trademark law has
also grown. Under the Supreme Court’s modern view of the scope
of Congress’s commerce power, Congress may regulate all
activities affecting interstate, foreign, or Indian-tribe commerce,
not just the interstate, foreign, and Indian-tribe commerce itself.57
54 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). Section 2 of the
Lanham Act, referred to by the Supreme Court in the above quotation, includes the rules
governing the nature of marks that may be registered. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (requiring, for
example, that the mark not be “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous,” or be “merely
descriptive,” unless in the latter case the applicant can prove some level of acquired
distinctiveness).
55 Using “interstate” commerce as shorthand for Congress’s constitutional power to
regulate commerce is efficient, but it of course actually understates the range of
commerce within Congress’s reach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have
Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes[.]”).
56 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“In the construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is plainly
apparent from the context– . . . [t]he word “commerce” means all commerce which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress.”).
57 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (“‘[T]he
authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and
injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.’”)
(quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942); see also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56–68 (2003)
(confirming, in the context of the Federal Arbitration Act, that the full reach of the
Commerce Clause “encompasses a wider range of transactions than those actually ‘in
commerce’--that is, ‘within the flow of interstate commerce’). As a result of this expansive
interpretation of the commerce power, and the definition of “commerce” provided in the
Lanham Act, section 43(a) is now almost unlimited in terms of providing a cause of action
to the owner of any mark used in the United States, as long as the defendant’s use affects
interstate, foreign or Indian-tribe commerce. But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
556–57 (1995) (“[E]ven these modern-era precedents which have expanded
congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer
limits. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court warned that the scope of the interstate
commerce power ‘must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and
remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate
the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government.’”) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
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The current case law is quite generous with respect to the question
of what “use in commerce”58 is sufficient for federal registration,
and thus is also generous with unregistered federal protection.59
The group of trademark users not making “use in commerce” of
their trademarks in a way that sufficiently affects interstate
commerce is very small indeed. On the other hand, while wholly
intrastate users make up only a small segment of today’s U.S.
market players, one can still imagine theoretical situations in
which federal registration might be out of reach due to the
interstate commerce requirement.60
A second group of trademark owners might be ineligible for
federal registration due to their actual knowledge of remote but
widespread common law uses of conflicting marks, making
impractical the pursuit of even the geographically limited federal
rights potentially available through a concurrent use application.61
(1937)).
58 Section 1 contains two bases for filing an application: use-based and intent-to-use.
Either route to registration requires that a trademark be in “use in commerce” before it
may be registered. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)–(d). Only registrations under section 44(e) need
not be used in commerce before registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e). Section 45 limits, to
some extent, what designations may be registered by providing a more specific definition
of “use in commerce” for both trademarks (used on goods) and service marks (used in
connection with services). See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (requiring, for use with goods, that the
mark be “placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated
therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale” and,
for use with services, that the mark be “used or displayed in the sale or advertising of
services”). Both of these use-based restraints on registration utilize the Lanham Act’s
broad meaning of “commerce” when they also require that the required use of the
mark—the sale or transport of goods, or the rendering of services—occur “in commerce.”
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a)–(d), 1127.
59 See, e.g., Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Restaurant Corp., 929 F.2d 662, 663–
66 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 838–39
(11th Cir. 1983). In terms of protection of unregistered marks, the requirements may be
somewhat less stringent than those for registration, since the precise nature of the
plaintiff’s use is not called into question by the statutory language in section 43(a). The
focus, if eligibility for federal protection were questioned, would be on the matter of
interstate versus intrastate use, in light of section 45’s (and the Commerce Clause’s)
restriction of federal trademark law to that dealing with the commerce over which
Congress has power. See supra notes 54, 56.
60 Although I think these theoretical situations will be few and far between, if existing at
all in light of modern commercial practices, I found one relatively recent case where a
judge dismissed a section 43(a) claim for failure to meet the interstate commerce
requirement. Ultimate Video Plus, Inc. v. Perrine Elecs., Inc., No. 95-CV-1325
(CGC/DNH), 1996 WL 481542, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing a section 43(a) claim
under rule 12(b) because the court found that plaintiff’s home video rental services in
Glenmont, New York did not fall within the scope of interstate commerce). All other
cases I found in which a claim to federal protection failed as a result of the interstate
commerce requirement predated the modern, more expansive understanding of the
interstate commerce clause and Congress’s authority thereunder.
As explained elsewhere in this Article, any intrastate-only users will still have a state
common law trademark claim (or a state unfair trade practices claim based on common
law trademark rights) that may be brought in state court, or even in federal court if there
is diversity jurisdiction.
61 A concurrent use application, which can result in a federal registration that applies only
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These federally unregistered owners would still have, however, a
federal section 43(a) claim against third party infringers. Federal
trademark rights and remedies only fall completely out of reach if
the plaintiff trademark owner cannot obtain any federal
protection for the mark allegedly infringed.62
The gap left in federal law at the current time, then, is only as
to users of trademarks whose use of the mark does not either take
place across a state, Indian, or foreign territorial line or affect
commerce that does so. This intrastate-commerce-only gap in
Lanham Act coverage could be filled by state common law alone.
State common law is, however, not alone. State registration
schemes continue to exist, and they are not mere historical
artifacts; state legislatures continue to revise and update them.
III. THE ROLE OF STATE TRADEMARK REGISTRATIONS UNDER CURRENT
LAW
State statutory rights began bolstering common law rights in
the latter half of the nineteenth century. The initial registration
statutes in many states focused on criminal liability, rather than
civil liability, for infringement of a state-registered mark.63 Today,
however, state trademark registration schemes lean more heavily
Each state’s
toward civil liability than criminal liability.64
to a portion of the U.S., can be filed by certain users of marks whose own use is and was
remote and in good faith with respect to third parties who also possess valid common law
rights that would conflict with an unrestricted federal registration. See 15 U.S.C. §§
1051(a)(3)(D), 1052(d).
62 The fact that a defendant might be a wholly intrastate user of a mark will not impede a
federal claim, because only the plaintiff must use its mark in interstate commerce. See
Germain, supra note 53, at 89–90 (noting that early decisions under section 43(a)
requiring that a defendant’s goods or service move across state lines or have a direct
connection with interstate commerce had, even by 1973, been discarded in favor of a
more liberal interpretation of the scope of the section, and opining that application of
section 43(a) to acts that are “purely intrastate except for their effects on interstate
commerce” is “consistent with Congress’ intention to extend the Lanham Act’s protection
to the fullest extent possible”). See also Jellibeans, 716 F.2d at 839.
63 According to Professor McCarthy’s trademark treatise, the common law rules governing
trademark infringement and the tort of passing off were well-established by the midnineteenth century, which is when state registration statutes focused more on criminal
than civil liability. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 5:2. The focus of early state statutes
on criminal, rather than civil, liability is demonstrated by the state trademark statutes
reprinted in JAMES L. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR TRADE INCLUDING TRADE-MARKS,
TRADE SECRETS, AND GOOD-WILL app. H (2d ed. 1909). Of the first twelve states to enact
trademark statutes (by approximately 1866), ten provided criminal remedies, while only
two provided solely civil remedies. See Zvi S. Rosen, In Search of the Trade-Mark Cases: The
Nascent Treaty Power and the Turbulent Origins of Federal Trademark Law, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
827, 831 n. 14 (2009). And only two of the ten states with criminal remedies included civil
remedies within the statutory scheme. See id.
64 The Model State Trademark Bill, which as discussed below has strongly influenced most
modern state trademark statutes, focuses on civil liability, leaving criminal measures to
state penal codes. Model State Trademark Bill §§ 12, 14(b) (2007) [hereinafter 2007
Model Bill], available at http://www.inta.org (links to “Policy and Advocacy,” “Model Laws
and Guidelines,” and “Model State Trademark Bill”) (providing for liability “in a civil
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substantive statutory rules governing a mark’s protectability, and
thus its registrability, largely follow both the Lanham Act and the
common law.65 The substance of a state statutory infringement
claim also closely follows the Lanham Act, which in turn was
modeled in substance, if not also in scope, on the common law.66
Modern state statutory schemes demonstrate greater
similarity than difference as a result of the influence of the Model
State Trademark Bill promulgated by the International Trademark
Association (“INTA”).67 The vast majority of state trademark

action by the registrant” and specifying that the provision of civil remedies “shall not
affect a registrant’s right to prosecute under any penal law of this state”). See also Model
State Anticounterfeiting Bill (2007), available at http://www.inta.org (links to “Policy and
Advocacy,” “Model Laws and Guidelines,” and “Model State Anticounterfeiting Bill”).
Criminal counterfeiting measures certainly still exist, and such laws have even been the
subject of modernization and harmonization efforts by the International Trademark
Association and other groups. See, e.g., Guide to Understanding the INTA Model State
Anticounterfeiting Bill, INTA, http://www.inta.org (links to “Policy and Advocacy,”
“Model Laws and Guidelines,” and “Guide to Understanding the Model State
Anticounterfeiting Bill”).
65 The federal rules of registrability, at least regarding distinctiveness, were largely,
although not entirely, derived from the common law standards. The Model Bill was
modeled after the Lanham Act. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 22:5, 22:7; Andrew L.
Goldstein, Bringing the Model State Trademark Bill into the 90s and Beyond, 83 TRADEMARK
REP. 226 (1993). Compare 2007 Model Bill, supra note 64, § 2, with 15 U.S.C. § 1052. Thus,
no matter whether a state’s law was modeled directly on the common law, the Lanham
Act, or the Model Bill, the state standards of registrability with respect to use and
distinctiveness will be very similar to standards for common law trademark protection.
One way in which the rules of registrability under both federal and state law may
vary from the common law rules can be seen in section 2(a) of the Lanham Act and the
counterpart provision in a number of state laws. Section 2(a) excludes from federal
registrability marks that are “immoral,” “scandalous,” or that “disparage” persons, beliefs
of institutions. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). The arguments supporting these exclusions are
based not in traditional trademark doctrine but instead in public policy. E.g., Stephen R.
Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous and
Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661 (1993). In addition, the federal law may at
times be broader than the common law, and the existence of common law rights is not
required before a mark may be registered either federally or under state law. For
example, collective and certification marks may not be protectable at common law, and
yet federal law allows for their registration. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 19:8. Other
examples where federal law may be broader than the common law can be found in the
McCarthy treatise. Id.
66 The parallelism of state statute and the Lanham Act often extends to the precise
language of the statute. The primary difference between the common law and either
Lanham Act section 32 or state infringement provisions is that the common law does not
(of course) require that a mark be registered before it is protected, while section 32 and
most state statutes do require prior registration. The primary commonalities between
statutory and common law rights are the rules of protectability, as noted above in note 65,
as well as the use of likelihood of confusion as the test for infringement.
67 For more information on INTA, which was formerly known as the United States
Trademark Association (or USTA), see About INTA -- Overview, INTA,
http://www.inta.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). The first Model State Trademark Bill
emerged in 1949 from the United States Trademark Association. Revised in 1964, the
Model Bill remained unchanged again until 1992. At that time, significant changes
related to the effect of a state registration were considered but rejected, including adding
presumptions of ownership and validity, as well as constructive notice. See Goldstein, supra
note 65, at 231–32. Throughout the life of the Model Bill, a state registration has
conferred no evidentiary or substantive advantage over a common law right: a certificate
of registration provides only proof of registration of the mark, thus it proves only that the
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statutes are modeled in some way after the Model Bill, with some
states making only modest changes and others adding more
significant variations.68
I analyze the value of a state trademark registration by first
examining the content of the varying state statutory registration
schemes and their associated infringement claims.69 I compare the
statutory language governing the effects of state registrations to
the federal statutes and case law,70 as well as to the common law.71
I have organized the comparison into four categories: evidentiary
or procedural effects; geographic scope of rights; nature and
breadth of the cause of action; and remedies.

owner may bring a statutory infringement claim. See 2007 Model Bill, supra note 64, §
5(b); Model State Trademark Bill § 4 (1964), reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 22.8.
Additional revisions to the Model Bill followed in 1996 and 2007, although these two
revisions focused on the anti-dilution provisions alone and were designed to better
coordinate with the federal anti-dilution provision introduced in 1995 and revised in
2006.
68 The Model Bill was conceived as a means of harmonizing state laws with one another, as
well as making those laws compatible with federal trademark statutes; since 1992, the
Model Bill has expressly stated the aim of harmony with the Lanham Act. See Goldstein,
supra note 65, at 226, 234, and sources cited therein; see also Guide to Understanding the
INTA Model State Trademark Bill, INTA, http://www.inta.org (links to “Policy and
Advocacy,” “Model Laws and Guidelines,” and “Guide to Understanding the Model State
Trademark Bill”) (stating the intent of the Model State Trademark Bill of 1992):
The intent of this Act is to provide a system of state trademark registration and
protection substantially consistent with the federal system of trademark
registration and protection under the Trademark Act of 1946, as amended. To
that end, the construction given the federal Act should be examined as
persuasive authority for interpreting and construing this Act.
A table summarizing and citing to relevant statutory registration and infringement
provisions in the Model Bill and all fifty states as of the publication of this article is set
forth in the appendix.
69 Here, I have focused on civil litigation because that is the primary means of enforcing
rights in trademarks, particularly at the state-law level: state-law criminal counterfeiting
measures do exist, see supra note 63, and are important in the narrow circumstances to
which they apply, but the bulk of reported decisions reflecting state-law enforcement are
civil in nature. This would seem logical because the marks making the best targets for
profitable counterfeiting are, in all likelihood, also those with an owner whose interests
are nationwide in scope and who has pursued federal registration and can thus use
federal anti-counterfeiting provisions.
70 A larger body of case law and commentary is available to aid in the interpretation of the
federal provisions, allowing for useful comparison and contrast with the state statutes. In
addition, the Model Bill has, since 1992, expressly referred courts to Lanham Act cases for
guidance, see supra note 68, and many states have included that instruction in their
statutes. For this reason, as well as because so few cases have ever carefully interpreted
and applied most of these state statutes, state courts and federal courts may and do refer
freely to federal case law.
71 It bears note that “the common law” varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction before the
passage of the Lanham Act, and one of the challenges in passing the Act was the process
of determining what version of the common law to include. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port,
Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585, 596–600
(2008). The passage of the Act and increased dominance of federal law means, however,
that when courts rely on “the common law” now, the variance has diminished, although it
has not disappeared. Decisions clearly reflecting common law principles unfettered by
the influence of the federal regime, however, are relatively few among modern reported
decisions. See supra note 17.
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A. Evidentiary and Procedural Effects
In thirty-one states, the registration of a mark simply creates a
certificate that may be used in evidence at a trial involving state
statutory claims for infringement.72 The most common language
provides that the registration certificate “shall be admissible in
evidence as competent and sufficient proof of the registration of
such mark in any action or judicial proceeding in any court of this
State.”73 The fact of registration does not prove anything else. In
six other states, the statutory registration scheme is silent on the
effect of state registration.74 The effect of registration in those
states should resemble the effect in the first thirty-one states. In all
of these states, the state registration certificate simply provides
access to a statutory cause of action for infringement. I call
registrations in these thirty-seven states “low value” because they
do not expand the scope of valid rights beyond those available
under the common law, nor do they have the potential to ease the
burden of proving validity in litigation.75
72 Those thirty-one states are Alabama (ALA. CODE § 8-12-9(b) (LexisNexis 2002)), Alaska
(ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.060) (2008)), Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1444(B)
(2003)), Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-205 (2001)), California (CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 14215(b) (West 2008)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3305(b) (2005)),
Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 482-24(b) (LEXIS through 2010-2011 Legis. Sess..)), Idaho
(IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-505 (2003)), Illinois (765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1036/25 (West
2009)), Indiana (IND. CODE § 24-2-1-5(b) (LexisNexis 2006)), Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §
548.105 (West 2011)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-206 (Supp. 2008)), Kentucky (KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.577(2) (LexisNexis 2008)), Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:215(B) (2003)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1523 (2009)), Mississippi (MISS.
CODE ANN. § 75-25-9 (West through 1996 amendments)), Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. §
417.021(2) (West 2001)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-12-312 (2007)), New
Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:4 (LexisNexis 2008)), New Jersey (N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:3-13.4 (West 2001)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3B-7 (2004)), New
York (N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-d (Supp. 2011)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-4
(2007)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-22-04 (Supp. 2007)), Ohio (OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1329.57 (LexisNexis 2006)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, § 24 (West
2002)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 647.045 (West 2011)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 39-15-1125(B) (Supp. 2008)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-505(b) (2001)),
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-3a-304 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009)), and West Virginia (W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 47-2-5 (LexisNexis 2006)).
Georgia recently amended its trademark statutes to delete a provision with this
evidentiary language, which will leave its law silent as of January 1, 2013. I have not
counted Georgia in the thirty-one states.
73 Statutes with this language were directly modeled after the Model Bill. See 2007 Model
Bill, supra note 64, § 5(b).
74 The six “silent” states are Georgia (with the caveat noted in note 72 that GA. CODE ANN.
§ 10-1-452 (2009) will provide for an evidentiary effect until December 31, 2012),
Maryland, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.
75 One of the thirty-one states using the Model Bill’s “low value” evidentiary language is,
interestingly, Ohio. As noted below in note 88, the Ohio Supreme Court in 1963 ruled
that limited-area in-state use may, in some circumstances, give rise to a state-wide right,
even without a registration. As a result, a holder of a valid registration in Ohio (meaning
a registration supported by prior and continuing in-state use), could actually own
enforceable rights in excess of those expressly provided by the registration statutes. This
does not, however, make an Ohio registration any more valuable. It, in fact, reinforces
the conclusion that in Ohio a registration is of low value, since the Ohio Supreme Court’s
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In eleven of the remaining thirteen states, the statutory
schemes add one feature relevant to litigation: a state registration
provides prima facie evidence of three issues vital to a successful
trademark infringement case: the validity of the registered mark,
ownership of the mark by the registrant, and the registrant’s
exclusive right to use the mark in commerce within the state in
connection with the goods and services listed in the registration
certificate.76 I call a state registration that provides prima facie
ruling did not depend on the existence of a registration. Another “low value” state is
Arkansas, which continue to categorize according to the language of the statute although
a federal appellate panel opinion has declared that an Arkansas registration provides
state-wide priority. See Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Cen. Ark. Area
th
Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 737 (8 Cir. 2001) (“State registration confers the
statewide right to use a service mark in connection with the registered services, subject to
defenses such as good faith prior use in a particular local market.”). The opinion
provided no specific support for this conclusion from the Arkansas statutes, referring only
to the general statement in the statutory scheme that the state registration system was
“substantially consistent” with the federal registration system. Id.
76 The eleven states are Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada,
Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. FLA STAT. ANN. § 495.061(2)
(West 2010) (“prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, registrant’s
ownership of the mark, and of registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in this state on
or in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate”); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 110H, § 5(b) (West Supp. 2011) (“prima facie evidence of the registrant’s
exclusive right to use the registered mark in this commonwealth on goods or services
specified in the registration”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 429.34(3) (West 2001)
(“evidence of registrant's right to use the mark throughout this state in connection with
the goods or services specified in the certificate”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.21(2) (West
Supp. 2008) (“prima facie evidence of registrant's ownership and exclusive right to use
the mark on or in connection with the goods or services described in the certificate”);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-132 (2008) (“prima facie evidence of the right to use the mark shown
in the registration on or in connection with the class or classes of goods or services
designated in the registration”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 600.350 (2007) (registration “raises a
disputable presumption that the person to whom the certificate was issued is the owner of
the mark in this State as applied to the goods or services described in the certificate”); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 6-2-4(d) (Supp. 2008) (“prima facie evidence of the registrant's exclusive
right to use the registered mark in this state on goods or services specified in the
registration”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.15(c) (West 2011) (“prima facie proof of
(1) the validity of the registration; (2) the registrant's ownership of the mark; and (3) the
registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in this state in connection with
the goods or services specified in the certificate”); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-92.6 (2006)
(“prima facie evidence of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's
exclusive right to use the registered mark within the Commonwealth on or in connection
with the goods or services specified in the certificate”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.040
(West, Westlaw through 2011 Legislation)(“prima facie evidence of: (1) The validity of the
registration of the trademark; (2) The registrant's ownership of the trademark; and (3)
The registrant's exclusive right to use the trademark in this state in connection with the
goods or services specified in the certificate”); WIS. STAT. § 132.031 (2009) (“certificate
shall, in all suits and prosecutions arising out of or depending upon any rights claimed
under such mark, be prima facie evidence of the adoption thereof and of the facts
prerequisite to registrations thereof”).
I have grouped these eleven states together and treated the relevant statutes as
roughly equivalent in my broader analysis and argument although the specific language of
each statute—and thus the precise extent and strength of the evidence obtained through
registration—varies among them. For example, in Michigan, the statute does not say the
registration is evidence of the “exclusive right” to use the mark, and it does not use the
term “prima facie evidence.” The statute simply provides, as noted above, that the
registration “shall be evidence of registrant’s right to use the mark throughout this state.”
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 429.34. In Nebraska, like Michigan, the statute refers to the
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evidence of these matters an “evidentiary-value” registration.
These evidentiary-value provisions do not follow the Model
Bill. Instead, they parallel the evidentiary effect of a federal
trademark registration.
In these eleven states, the state
registration will provide a plaintiff with the evidentiary shortcuts
that are also provided by a federal registration.77 An evidentiaryvalue registration does not extinguish or otherwise limit common
law rights acquired in good faith, which are expressly saved by
statute in each of the eleven states.78
In six of these eleven states, a registration does not expand or
create substantive rights beyond those available within the
common law. Instead, the registration only officially recognizes
those rights and potentially eases the burden of proving them in
the event of litigation. The registered mark remains subject to the
good-faith acquisition of common law rights by third parties as
well as challenges to any aspect of validity.79 I refer to these six
“right” to use the mark, not the “exclusive right.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-132.
Nevada’s statutory effect may actually be weaker than the other states, since the
“disputable presumption” created by the registration is “that the person to whom the
certificate was issued is the owner of the mark in this State as applied to the goods or
services described in the certificate.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 600.350. As such, it does not
directly address validity or an exclusive right to use the mark. Nevertheless, I think courts
would likely apply the presumption to include validity and exclusive rights, if the issue
ever arose in litigation.
In Virginia, a separate provision adds to the evidentiary value of a registration
certificate: “In any proceeding under this chapter, any certificate of registration issued by
the Commonwealth or the United States Patent and Trademark Office shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.” VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-92.13(D).
In Washington, the effect of prima facie evidence of validity is limited by another
provision in the Washington trademark statutes:
Registration under this title does not constitute prima facie evidence that a mark
is not merely descriptive, deceptively misdescriptive, or geographically
descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of the goods or services with which it is
used, or is not primarily merely a surname, unless the applicant has made
substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a trademark in this state or
elsewhere in the United States for the five years next preceding the date of the
filing of the application for registration.
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.020(2)(West, Westlaw through 2011 Legislation).
In Wisconsin, the registration has evidentiary value, but it is provided in a more
oblique manner than in others. The registration provides evidence of the mark owner’s
“adoption thereof and of the facts prerequisite to registrations thereof.” WIS. STAT. §
132.031. The facts necessary to obtain the registration include a claim that the registrant
has the “right to the use of the [mark], and that no other person . . . has such right either
in the identical form or in any such near resemblance thereto as may be calculated to
deceive.” WIS. STAT. § 132.01(1). This makes Wisconsin registrations of limited
evidentiary value, but arguably evidence of the owner’s exclusive right to use the mark in
the state even though the statute does not expressly refer to a registration as evidence of
an “exclusive” right.
77 See supra Part II.B.1. Because none of the state schemes couple “evidentiary-value” state
registrations with the possibility of incontestability, the effect of federal incontestability
upon the evidentiary value of a registration, see supra note 31, is not relevant to
understanding this aspect of the effect of a state registration.
78 See supra note 18.
79 See Hot-Hed, Inc. v. Safehouse Habitats (Scotland), Ltd., 333 S.W.3d 719, 730 (Tex.
App. 2010) (ruling against registrant of mark on issue of validity and stating the following:
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state schemes as “evidentiary value only.”80 In the other five of the
eleven evidentiary-value state registration systems, however, a state
registration brings with it more than a mere evidentiary effect, as
further discussed below in Part III.B.
The statutory schemes in Colorado and Connecticut do not
fit neatly within the two categories discussed above, namely, “low
value” (thirty-seven states) or “evidentiary value” (eleven states).
Colorado substantially revised its statutory scheme in 2006 in
order to eliminate a statutory cause of action for infringement and
to downgrade the effect of a state trademark registration, now
known in Colorado as a “statement of trademark registration.”
The statement of trademark registration “does not enlarge or
otherwise affect rights” created by common law, and it “does not
confer upon the registrant any substantive right or create any
remedy not otherwise available.”81 The statement of trademark
registration simply provides “notice of the claims made in the
statement of trademark registration from and after the date and
time [it] is filed.”82 The effect of this unique statutory scheme
means Colorado is also a low-value state for purposes of this
article. In Connecticut, a statutory oddity makes the outcome of
litigation difficult to predict. State registered marks can obtain
incontestable status after five years, according to one provision,
but another provision appears to allow a court to cancel a
registration at any time for not complying with any of the
standards of registrability, which includes the existence of a senior
For the sake of argument, I have classified
prior user.83
“At trial, Safehouse presented evidence [of genericism] sufficient to rebut the
presumption that the registration of the ’habitat’ mark was valid and that the mark was
protectable . . . . Thus, the presumption [of ownership, validity, and exclusive rights] was
extinguished and the burden of persuading the jury that the term ’habitat’ was eligible for
protection remained with Hot-Hed.”) (citations omitted); All Am. Builders, Inc. v. All Am.
Siding of Dallas, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 484, 489 (Tex. App. 1999) (explaining that the
rebuttable presumption created by a state registration shifts the burden of producing
evidence to the non-registered party, and after the party offers evidence contradicting
validity, the presumption is extinguished and has no evidentiary value, and does not affect
the burden of persuasion).
80 The “evidentiary value only” state schemes are in Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada,
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
81 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-70-103(2)–(3) (2008).
82 Id. See also Arthur H. Travers, The Revision of the Colorado Trademark Registration Statute,
36 COLO. LAW. 39, 40 (2007) (explaining that a “key provision of the new law . . . makes
explicit that registration merely gives public notice of the claims in the statement of
trademark registration . . . in any case in which the issue of notice is material from and
after the date on which it is filed.”).
83 Connecticut does not by statute make a registration prima facie evidence of validity,
ownership, or an exclusive right to use the mark in the state, nor does a Connecticut
registration provide constructive notice. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-11e, 35-11a–
11m (West 2005 & Supp. 2011). Nevertheless, Connecticut law does provide that stateregistered marks can obtain incontestable status after five years, in a manner largely
parallel to the federal incontestability provision, but without the need to file an affidavit
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Connecticut registrations as having potential evidentiary value.
In sum, the evidentiary or procedural value of a state
registration falls into one of three categories: in thirty-eight states,
a registration has low to no evidentiary value; in one state, a
registration may have evidentiary value; and in eleven states, a
registration has prima facie evidentiary value roughly parallel to
the value of a federal registration in litigation under the Lanham
Act.84
B. Geographic Scope of Rights
In five of the eleven evidentiary-value state registration
systems, a state registration creates state-wide constructive notice
of the registrant’s claim of ownership.85 These constructive notice
provisions, like the evidentiary-value provisions, were inspired not
or declaration. See id. § 35-11m (providing for incontestability of the right to use the
mark, but not specifying an exclusive right to use, and listing substantive requirements
largely paralleling the federal incontestability provision). Incontestability in Connecticut
is curious in that it would appear that a court can cancel a registration at any time for not
complying with the standards of registrability, which include a conflict with a prior user’s
rights. See id. § 35-11b. Also, the express savings clause does not carve out the
incontestability provision, so it would seem that the savings clause overrides the
incontestability provision with respect to a prior common law user’s right to continue its
use (although incontestability might mean that the registered user could not be excluded
from use in the state). See id. § 35-11k.
84 State statutory schemes also do not differentiate themselves from the Lanham Act, and
thereby create value for a state registrant, by creating an advantage in terms of the statute
of limitations. The Lanham Act does not create or supply a statute of limitations for its
infringement actions. The Supreme Court applies the “well-established rule that statutes
of limitation for federal causes of action not supplied with their own limitations periods
will be borrowed from state law.” Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 334
(1989). This principle has been applied to the Lanham Act. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3,
§31:33 (listing cases from various states). As a result, even if a state statutory scheme
supplied a statute of limitations for infringement of a registered trademark (which I
observe that they generally do not), it would not create any variation between a state
infringement action and a Lanham Act infringement claim brought in that state. A
federal dilution claim, first included in federal law in 1995, would be limited by the fouryear state of limitations applicable to all federal laws enacted after December 1, 1990 that
do not otherwise have a limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2006).
85 The five states are Massachusetts, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110H, § 5(b) (West Supp. 2011) (“Registration of or renewal of
a mark provided by this chapter shall be constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of
ownership thereof . . . but shall not preclude an opposing party from proving any legal or
equitable defense or defect which might have been asserted if the mark had not been
registered.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.24 (West 2004) (“The secretary of state shall keep
for public examination a record of all marks filed or renewed under [the registration
provisions]. The record of registration is constructive notice of registrant's claim of
ownership of the mark registered.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-4(d) (Supp. 2008)
(“Registration of or renewal of a mark provided by this chapter shall be constructive
notice of the registrant's claim of ownership . . . but shall not preclude an opposing party
from proving any legal or equitable defense or defect which might have been asserted if
the mark had not been registered.”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.15(b) (West
2011) (“Registration of a mark under this chapter is constructive notice throughout this
state of the registrant's claim of ownership of the mark throughout this state.”); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.040 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Legislation). (“Registration of a
trademark under this chapter shall be constructive notice of the registrant's claim of
ownership of the trademark throughout this state.”).
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by the Model Bill but by the Lanham Act and its endowment of
federal registrations with the effect of nationwide constructive
notice.86
As further explained above in the context of federal
registrations, a constructive notice provision can eliminate the
ability of a common law user to claim that it acquired its rights in
good faith after the date of registration. The common law
requires a junior user to operate remotely, and in good faith, in
order for the junior user to acquire superior common law rights in
its geographic area of use,87 and the purpose of constructive use is
to eliminate the geographic fragmentation that these remote,
good-faith users can create. A court weighing a conflict between a
state registrant and a common law user could give a state’s
constructive-notice provision the same effect it would give the
Lanham Act’s constructive notice provision in section 22, rather
than including the issue of notice as one of several considerations
within the determination of good faith. If it did so, a registration
in one of these five states would give the registrant state-wide
priority in the mark through the combined effect of a constructive
notice provision with prima facie evidence of a right to use the
mark within the state. I therefore refer to state registrations that
create constructive notice and evidentiary value as “high-value”
Even in the five high-value states, state
registrations.88
registrations, like federal registrations, do not extinguish common
law rights existing at the time of registration but only constrain the
86 It bears emphasis that these state provisions do not parallel section 7(c) of the Lanham
Act, which expressly provides for nationwide constructive use, and therefore nationwide
priority. The effect in these state statutes is only parallel to section 22, which provides for
constructive notice alone.
87 See supra Part II.A.
88 As noted in greater detail in note 85, the “high-value” states are Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington. The practical value of constructive
notice, of course, varies somewhat with the geographic size of the territory in which the
notice operates. For that reason, the practical effect of state-wide constructive notice on
determinations of good faith would seem to be significantly less in Rhode Island than, for
example, Texas.
Ohio, curiously, does not statutorily provide for statewide constructive notice or
priority, although as noted above in note 75, in 1963 the Ohio Supreme Court held that
even geographically limited use of a mark within the state can entitle a party to the
exclusive right to use the mark throughout the state, if the party also demonstrates the
probability of expanding its use throughout the state. See Younker v. Nationwide Mutual
Ins. Co., 191 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio 1963). Although Younker predates the modern Ohio
trademark statutes, it likely remains good law since it was based on the common law
(rather than registered rights, which in that case post-dated the defendant’s first use).
The evidence of probable expansion in that case was arguably quite weak, see id. at 151–53
(Taft, C.J., dissenting), so if Younker remains good law, its effect is just as powerful with
respect to state-wide priority in Ohio as a constructive notice and use provision would be if
enacted in connection with Ohio’s registration system. Because the decision was based on
the common law rather than a registered right, however, it does not place Ohio’s statutory
scheme in the “high-value” category.
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acquisition of rights after the registration date. In litigation
between a state registrant and a common law user whose use
predates the registration, the registrant must rely solely on its
common law rights, if any, that have priority over the other party
in a particular geographic area. This is true even if the registrant’s
first use predates the other party’s first use.
The geographic benefit of a registration in a high-value state
arises only in state-law-based litigation, however, and does not
expand an owner’s geographic scope of rights in the face of a
federal registration. A relatively well-known case, Burger King of
Florida, Inc. v. Hoots,89 demonstrates a state registration’s
interaction with a federal registration and its power of nationwide
constructive use. In that case, the state registration predated both
the federal registration and the federal registrant’s in-state use of
the mark, but the federal registrant, Burger King, was able to
enjoin the Hoots family from operating one of its two restaurants.
The federal registrant of the BURGER KING mark first used
it in Florida in 1953 (expanding to five other states by 1956), and
its federal registration issued in 1961, the same year that it
expanded to Illinois. The Hoots family first used the BURGER
KING mark in Illinois in 1957 and obtained an Illinois registration
in 1959. The family opened a second restaurant using the mark in
1962. The federal BURGER KING registrant succeeded in ousting
the family from its second location—in a town less than 12 miles
away from the first—because it was opened after the federal
registration issued and thus was opened with constructive notice of
the registration. The federal registrant was (and continues to
be)90 excluded from the twenty-mile-radius market area around
the first Hoots family BURGER KING restaurant. The fact that the
second restaurant fell within this market area did not save it from
the federal registrant’s rights, nor did the fact that the Hoots
family had obtained its Illinois registration before the federal
registration issued.
Another appellate decision discussing the application of the
common law defense in the section 32 context is Spartan Food
Systems, Inc. v. HFS Corp.91 HFS obtained a Virginia state

Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968).
See Jeremy Hobson, There's Only One Burger King in This Town, MARKETPLACE (American
Public
Media,
Nov.
27,
2007),
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/11/27/burger_king.
Online
restaurant review site “Yelp” continues to list reviews for the Hoots business as well. See
Review of Burger King, http://www.yelp.com/biz/burger-king-mattoon (last visited
August 26, 2011).
91 Spartan Food Sys., Inc. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1987).
89
90
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registration for QUINCY’S, in connection with restaurant services,
in 1982 (with its first use dating from 1979 in only the northern
part of the state). Spartan federally registered its QUINCY’S mark
in connection with restaurant services in 1984 (with its first use in
other states in 1976). Spartan opened restaurants in Virginia in
1985 in areas separate from HFS’s area of use. HFS, the state
registrant and first user in Virginia, attempted to convince the
court that it should have exclusive rights in all of Virginia, rather
than only in its area of actual use. The Fourth Circuit rejected
that argument, whether it was based on the common law or the
Virginia state registration:
The market areas of Spartan and H.F.S. are distinct and
geographically separate.
In sum, common law limits H.F.S.’s defense under § 33(a) of
the Lanham Act to the area of its prior use in northern
Virginia. Common law also limits the injunctive relief under §
43(a) to exclude Spartan’s use of the mark only in northern
Virginia. Hanover Milling . . . and United Drug . . . set forth the
principles of common law that govern this aspect of the case.
....
H.F.S.’s reliance on state law to assert exclusive use of the mark
throughout Virginia directly conflicts with §§ 22 [nationwide
constructive notice created by a registration] and 33(a)
[explaining a registration’s evidentiary effect] of the Lanham
Act that enable Spartan to use its registered marks in areas of
Virginia where H.F.S. did not use the mark prior to Spartan’s
federal registration. The express terms of § 45 of the Act which
provide for its preemption of state law require that the conflict
between Spartan’s federal protection and H.F.S.’s state law
claims must be resolved in favor of Spartan.92

Superior common law trademark rights accruing from prior
and continuing use of a mark in a particular geographic area,
then, can provide a defense to an action for trademark
infringement brought by a federal registrant. A state trademark
registration does not. There is no support in the case law or the
Lanham Act for an argument that a state registration—apart from
the actual use supporting the registration—creates a prior user
defense in the face of an action under section 32.93 The wider
Id. at 1284.
Related, although not directly on point, is the rule applied by the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) in assessing evidence of use in the context of an
opposition proceeding. The USPTO, supported by case law in the Federal Circuit, does
92
93
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range of “legal or equitable” defenses available to fight an action
for infringement of a contestable federal registration was
developed through the common law without reference to state
registrations. And the more specific, statutory defensive priority
effected by section 33(b) relies expressly on the extent of the
defendant’s use before the registrant’s priority date. So even a
high-value state registration will not alter the scope of the prior
user defense to a section 32 claim, because (1) the statute derives
the defense from the common law, which relies on actual use (and
perhaps a zone of expansion or reputation) and not on a state
political boundary,94 and (2) the Lanham Act creates limited
not allow either opposers or applicants to satisfy the requirement of proof of prior use
simply by providing a state registration certificate. See West Florida Seafood, Inc. v. Jet
Rests., Inc., 31 F.3d 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1994):
The regulatory licenses [submitted by opposer to support a claim of prior use of
a mark], covering the periods of February 4, 1981 to September 30, 1981 and
October 1, 1984 to September 30, 1986, and West's state registration for “FAST
EDDIE'S PLACE-WARM BEER-LOUSY FOOD,” obtained June 19, 1985 on the
basis of a claimed first use of February 2, 1981, also corroborate West's prior use
assertions. The TTAB refused to accord this evidence any weight on the basis
that “none of these licenses proves that the petitioner actually engaged in
restaurant services under the mark during these periods” and “neither the claim
made in the application nor the filing date of an application for a state
registration constitutes proof of use of the mark.” Although there may be merit
to the proposition that a license is not in and of itself proof that the licensed
entity was actually engaged in the licensed activity, this does not mean that such
a license has no evidentiary value at all. Indeed, where there is additional evidence
relating to actual use, such a license becomes quite probative in that it further corroborates
the other evidence. The same applies to a state registration.
Id. at 1127 (emphasis added). The opposer in West Florida Seafood had also submitted
newspaper advertisements and food service inspection reports to support its claim of prior
use of FAST EDDIE’S as a service mark or, at the very least, as a trade name. See also
Faultless Starch Co. v. Sales Producers Assocs., Inc., 530 F.2d 1400, 1401 n.2 (C.C.P.A.
1976) (stating, in the context of an opposition, that “[applicant] submitted numerous
state registrations as evidence of early use. State registrations alone do not establish
use.”).
Because state registrations generally require that the applicant submit specimens of
use and a verified statement of the first date of use in commerce in the state in question, a
state registration could provide some support for a defendant’s claim of prior use. But
that support would not come from the legal act of registration; instead, it would come
from reliance on those preserved specimens of use and somewhat-more-contemporaneous
verified statements regarding the first date of use in commerce. Ultimately the state
registrant would be required to provide more direct evidence of its use-based priority than
the mere existence of a state registration certificate.
94 But see Advance Stores Co. v. Refinishing Specialties, Inc., 188 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1999).
In Advance Stores, a Sixth Circuit panel affirmed a district court’s reading of applicable law
for the prior use defense to a claim of infringement of an incontestable registration, even
though the court considered only section 15, and not section 33, of the Lanham Act. The
result of the court’s reading was that both the district court and the Sixth Circuit ruled
that state law, and not federal law, delimits the extent of a prior user’s rights following a
junior user’s registration. See id. at 412 n.4 (observing that section 15 provides for
incontestability “except to the extent, if any, to which the use of a mark registered on the
principal register infringes a valid right acquired under the law of any State or Territory
by use of a mark or trade name continuing from a date prior to the date of registration”).
But section 15 does not set forth the defense to an infringement claim—section 33 does.
This particular issue was not ultimately decided in Advance Stores, because the state
registration in the case was cancelled (it post-dated the federal registration). But a close
reading of the case indicates that the Sixth Circuit might have allowed, if a state statute so
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preemption in cases of conflict between state and federal law.95
Importantly, any geographic scope-related benefit of a state
registration is limited to the five high-value states. Low-value and
evidentiary-value registrations, which all also exist in conjunction
with common law rights, do not provide a registrant with priority
over a common law user in a disputed area, regardless of when the
registration issued. In a conflict between a common law user and
a state registrant in forty-five states, common law priority rules
based on extent of use and reputation will determine which party
has priority in a particular area of the state.96 In these forty-five
states, a state registration has no bearing on the geographic scope
of the registrant’s enforceable rights in the registered mark.
Secondly, even the high-value registrations provide the
trademark owner with a benefit only within the boundaries of the
state, and only then when litigation arises under state law. No
weight or breadth ascribed to a state registration under state law
will provide the state registrant with ammunition to assert priority
over a federal registrant of a conflicting mark. In litigation with a
federal registrant raising a claim under section 32 of the Lanham
Act, a prior state registration does not demonstrate or substitute
for actual use in the entire state, and a state registrant will find no
relief from liability by virtue of its state trademark registration.
C. Nature and Breadth of the Cause of Action
The basic cause of action for violation of trademark rights is a
confusion-based claim of infringement. The trademark owner
claims that the user of a similar or identical mark is likely to cause
confusion of consumers as to source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement. Forty-nine of the fifty states currently connect state
registrations to a statutory infringement claim of this basic type,97
and forty-eight of those forty-nine states restrict a statutory
specified, a state registration to create statewide rights (versus rights only in the area of
actual use), even in the face of a federal registration.
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within
the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks
in such commerce[,] [and] to protect registered marks used in such commerce from
interference by State, or territorial legislation . . . .”); Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Hoots,
403 F.2d 904, 907-08 (7th Cir. 1968).
96 Cf. Advance Stores, 188 F.3d at 413 (declining to apply the Ohio rule of statewide priority
to Kentucky and observing that the Ohio rule is unusual in light of common law
principles, which focus on areas of actual use and reputation). But see supra notes 75, 88
(discussing Ohio Supreme Court decision providing state-wide rights under the common
law).
97 As explained above in Part III.A., Colorado’s statutory law of trademarks begins and
ends with the possibility of obtaining a “statement of trademark registration.” It is the
only state whose law does not create a statutory infringement cause of action for stateregistered marks. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-70-103 (2008).
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infringement claim to registered marks only.98 The significance of
the “exclusive” state statutory infringement claim requires
examination of its substance and a comparison of that substance
to the claims available under the Lanham Act and state common
law.99
Most state statutory causes of action for infringement either
directly copy or are otherwise modeled on the Model Bill.100

98 New Jersey is the lone state extending the statutory claim of infringement to owners of
unregistered marks. See N.J. STAT ANN. § 56:3-13.16a (West Supp. 2011).
99 At the risk of stating the obvious, but for the sake of completeness, I note here that a
state registration only provides access to a state statutory claim and does not have any
relationship to a federal claim under section 32. On its face, section 32 of the Lanham
Act provides for an infringement claim by the owner of a “registered mark,” but the
Lanham Act is clear that when it refers to a “registered mark,” it refers only to federally
registered rights:
The term “registered mark” means a mark registered in the United States Patent
and Trademark Office under this chapter or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or
the Act of February 20, 1905, or the Act of March 19, 1920. The phrase “marks
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office” means registered rights.
15 U.S.C. § 1127. Nothing in section 32 depends on, or even makes relevant, the
ownership of a state trademark registration.
Section 43(a) does not provide any rights to the owner of a state-registered
trademark that it does not also provide to the owner of unregistered common law rights.
The statutory language does not differentiate between these two types of owners, and case
law bears out the lack of relevance for a state registration. Courts applying section 43(a)
to the infringement of federally unregistered trademark rights simply assess whether the
alleged trademark owner possesses rights enforceable under common law principles.
Applying these common law principles would require proof of use of a distinctive mark,
not mere proof of state-registered status. Some courts undertake a specific analysis of
whether the alleged trademark owner has used its mark in interstate commerce, see, e.g.,
Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 838–39 (11th Cir. 1983), while
others do not address the issue. In any event, I found no evidence that the outcome of a
section 43(a) action is or should be affected by the existence or non-existence of a state
registration.
Section 43(a) protects, as noted above, marks that are not federally registered.
Claims under section 43(a) require, by and large, the same basic proof of infringement
required under section 32, namely, proof that defendant’s activities will cause a likelihood
of confusion, deception or mistake. The difference between sections 32 and 43(a) is
simply that the plaintiff’s claim of priority in the mark is based on common law, or
unregistered rights rather than federally registered rights. See, e.g., Jellibeans, 716 F.2d at
846. Courts applying either section require, pursuant to the statutory language, proof of a
likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception arising from the alleged infringer’s
conduct.
Section 43(a) provides no statutory defenses. Nevertheless, it is understood that a
section 43(a) defendant may assert at least the same defenses as a section 32 defendant,
namely, all legal or equitable defenses or defects found within the common law of
trademarks. See supra Part II.B.3. As further explained above, the defensive trademark
rights that will be considered by a court in a section 43(a) case will arise from a
defendant’s prior or remote innocent use–and not from a state registration–since it is
prior or remote innocent use that provides defensive rights under the common law of
trademarks.
100 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-12-16 (LexisNexis 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-450 (2009);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110H, § 12 (West Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1329.65 (LexisNexis 2006). Section 12 of the 2007 Model State Trademark Bill provides,
in full:
Subject to the provisions of Section 16 hereof [common law savings clause], any
person who shall
(a) use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation of a mark registered under this Act in connection
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Under the Model Bill:
any person who shall . . . use . . . any reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation of a mark registered under this Act
in connection with the sale, distribution, offering for sale, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to
deceive as to the source of origin of such goods or services . . .
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant . . . .101

The Model Bill, in turn, takes most of its language from
section 32 of the Lanham Act, which states that
[a]ny person who shall . . . use in commerce any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant
for the remedies hereinafter provided.102

with the sale, distribution, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or
mistake or to deceive as to the source of origin of such goods or services; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any such mark and apply
such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs,
prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, or advertisements intended to be used
upon or in connection with the sale or other distribution in this state of such
goods or services;
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for any and all of the remedies
provided in Section 14 hereof, except that under subsection (b) hereof the
registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have
been committed with the intent to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.
2007 Model Bill, supra note 64, § 12. Most state infringement provisions that mirror
section 12 of the Model Bill also mirror section 32 of the Lanham Act, see infra note 102,
so the modeling in some cases may be the result of a state legislature’s referring directly to
the Lanham Act rather than a state legislature’s using the Model Bill. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.26 (West 2011) (containing language like the Model Bill for the
infringement action but very unlike the Model Bill for remedies).
101 2007 Model Bill, supra note 64, § 12.
102 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). Section 32(1) currently provides, in full:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark
and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
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The framing of Lanham Act infringement in terms of
consumer confusion, finally, reflects the state of the common law
in the middle of the twentieth century when the Lanham Act was
enacted.103 It should not be surprising to find very little difference
between the substantive rights granted to a state-registered mark
by statute and those granted to an unregistered mark by state
common law. State registrants in states using the Model Bill may
find their state statutory rights somewhat narrower than the rights
granted by modern section 32, section 43(a), or by the common
law. In 1962, Congress broadened section 32 by removing limiting
language after “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.”104 It removed “purchasers as to the source of origin of
such goods or services,”105 but most of that language (excluding
“purchasers”) is still included in the Model Bill and many state
laws.106
In any event, as a result of the parallels to section 32 and
common law principles, state-registered status does nothing to
expand or modify the nature or breadth of the basic infringement
cause of action, regardless of the source of the cause of action in
federal or state law.107 As a result of either direct modeling on
provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled
to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with
knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive.
Id. The text of the Model Bill varies somewhat from section 32. For example, section 32
does not refer to a provision expressly preserving common law rights. Other variation is
style rather than substance, such as where the Model Bill reorders language from section
32 or modifies sentence structure.
103 See sources cited supra note 9. See also Beverly W. Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of
American Trademark Law, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 121, 140–41 (1978) (“By 1946, and the
Lanham Act’s passage, the courts had largely read into the previous Act the ‘likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive’ test for infringement, but the need
remained for a clear statutory statement and its inclusion was a major advance.”). Compare
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (protecting registered marks from infringement, based on a likelihood
of confusion, mistake, or deception) with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (protecting unregistered
marks from infringement based on a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception).
104 See Act of October 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769 (1962).
105 Id.
106 Section 32 now simply provides for liability when the relevant acts by defendant are
“likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), while
the Model Bill provides for liability when the acts are “likely to cause confusion or mistake
or to deceive as to the source of origin of such goods or services,” 2007 Model Bill, supra
note 64, § 12. Whether this means that the Model Bill, and state statutes that follow it, will
be applied by courts to address only a narrower range of confusion, mistake, or deception
caused by a defendant than does Section 32 is an interesting and open question.
107 Even though all states have co-existing statutory schemes and common law trademark
rights, no state’s case law demonstrates that owning a state registration has any effect on a
plaintiff’s common law trademark claim or a claim based on common law rights that is
pursued through an unfair trade practices or unfair competition statute. I have tried in
vain to find such an effect. So although a plaintiff with a state registration may bring both
common law and statutory trademark claims under state law (except in Colorado, see supra
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section 32, or use of the Model Bill, the statutory infringement
cause of action rarely varies from the common law or the Lanham
Act, including the Act’s protection for unregistered marks in
section 43(a).108 When the statutory action does vary, however, it
can be even narrower than other forms of protection. For
example, the statutory infringement claim has been interpreted to
be quite narrow in Wisconsin, extending only to identical or
substantially indistinguishable marks rather than a broader group
In Vermont, the statutory
of uses creating confusion.109
infringement claim is also likely narrower than the common law or
the Lanham Act as a result of its emphasis on imitations,
“counterfeit” marks and otherwise seemingly identical or “false”
uses of registered marks.110 No state’s statutory scheme brings an
otherwise non-infringing third-party activity within the scope of a
basic infringement claim. Accordingly, having a state-registered
trademark does not provide the mark owner with a substantive
advantage in litigation against an alleged infringer.
The state-registered status of a trademark also does nothing
to enhance the access a trademark owner may have to a claim of
dilution, which is recognized both in federal law and in the law of

Part III.A.) for the purpose of evaluating the effect of a state registration on a plaintiff’s
rights, the plaintiff’s common law claims can be eliminated from the analysis.
108 See supra Part II.B.5.
109 See Madison Reprographics v. Cook’s Reprographics, 552 N.W.2d 440, 450-51 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1996) (interpreting WIS. STAT. § 132.033(1), which provides that the holder of a
state registration for a mark “may proceed by suit to enjoin the manufacture, use, display
or sale of any counterfeit mark identical to or substantially identical to that mark.”); cf.
Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir. 1996).
110 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2530 (2006):
Subject to the provisions of section 2532 of this title, no person shall knowingly
and wilfully:
(1) Falsely make, counterfeit, imitate, sell, offer for sale, or in any way utter or
circulate any trademark which has been registered in accordance with the
provisions of this subchapter;
(2) Affix to any article of merchandise a false or counterfeit or imitation
trademark, or the genuine trademark of another which has been registered in
accordance with the provisions of this subchapter, without the latter's consent;
(3) Sell, keep, or offer for sale an article of merchandise, to which is affixed a
false or counterfeit trademark, or the genuine trademark, or an imitation of the
trademark of another which has been registered in accordance with the
provisions of this subchapter, without the latter's consent;
(4) Have in his possession a counterfeit trademark or a die, plate, brand or
other thing for the purpose of falsely making or counterfeiting a trademark
which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter;
or
(5) Make or sell, or offer to sell or dispose of, or have in his possession with
intent to sell or dispose of, an article of merchandise with a trademark which
has been registered in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter by
another, which indicates falsely the quantity, character, place of manufacture or
production, or person manufacturing, producing or sponsoring the article.
Id.
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at least thirty-eight states.111 State registrations are, in fact, entirely
irrelevant to a federal dilution claim. Section 43(c) provides a
federal cause of action for a trademark owner seeking to prevent
the “dilution” of its trademark rights, even if the challenged use
differs so much from the owner’s use that there is no likelihood of
confusion. The federal statute, unlike some state statutes,112 only
protects “famous” marks.113 Section 43(c) defines a famous mark
as one “widely recognized by the general consuming public of the
United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of
the mark’s owner,” and it provides a short, nonexclusive list of
factors that may be considered in determining whether a mark is
“famous.”114 Registered rights are mentioned in that list, but the
reference is only to federally registered rights: “[w]hether the
mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.”115 As a result,
while federal law requires fame, it does not require federal
registration. Even unregistered marks can be shown to have the
requisite level of fame and thus potentially qualify for federal antidilution protection.116
A state registration fares no better on the defensive side of a
federal dilution claim. A registration might bolster, in an
evidentiary sense, a defendant’s claim that its use began before the
plaintiff’s mark became famous.117 As noted above in the
discussion of defenses to actions under section 32, however, prior
111
112
113
114

See WELKOWITZ, supra note 15.
See infra note 120.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(c)(1) (2006).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). The full list of statutory factors is as follows:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of
the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services
offered under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(iv).
As noted above, the statute does not list state-registered status as a factor relevant to
fame. From a plaintiff’s perspective, this decreases the value of a state registration in the
context of a federal dilution claim. In assessing whether a trademark is “famous,”
however, courts may consider “all relevant factors,” not only those expressly listed. As
long as the fact is relevant to the question of “whether a mark possesses the requisite
degree of recognition,” a court can consider it. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). The question
becomes whether a state registration is relevant to the requirement of wide recognition as
a designation of source by the general consuming public of the United States. Although it
is possible for a court to disagree, I do not think that it is relevant.
117 The federal dilution statute clearly requires the owner of the famous mark to prove
that the defendant’s use began after the owner’s mark became famous. For further
discussion of the evidentiary significance of a state registration when proving use of a
mark, see note 93, supra.
115
116
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use is the fundamental issue, not prior state registration. And
while section 43(c)(6) provides that a federal registration is a bar
to a dilution action brought under state law, it does not give a state
registration any defensive weight in a federal dilution action.118
Federal dilution law does not provide any offensive or defensive
significance for a state-registered mark that it does not also
provide for a mark protected by the common law by virtue of its
use in commerce.
At the state level, while thirty-eight states provide a statutory
cause of action for dilution of a mark, only Alaska and
Connecticut limit a dilution claim to a mark that is both famous
and registered within the state.119 All other state dilution statutes
cover both registered and unregistered marks within the scope of
the dilution claim.120 Twenty-eight of the state dilution statutes are
modeled after the federal dilution statute121 and include registered
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(6).
See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.180(d) (2008) (providing an action against dilution that is
similar to the 1995 FTDA but extends only to marks both registered and famous in
Alaska); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11i(c) (West 2005) (providing an action against
dilution that mirrors the 1995 FTDA but extends only to marks both registered and
famous in Connecticut).
120 Ten of the thirty-eight state dilution statutes do not require fame (Delaware, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and
Texas), while the rest, including Alaska and Connecticut (cited in note 119), require fame
within the state or some significant portion of it. ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (LEXIS through
2010 amendments); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1448.01 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71213 (2001); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14247 (West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313
(Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b)
(2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482-32 (LEXIS through 2010-2011 Legis. Sess.); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 48-513 (2003); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1036/65 (West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-21-13.5 (LexisNexis 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.113 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
81.214 (Supp. 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
1530 (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110H, § 13 (West Supp. 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 333.285 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (West through 2009 amendments);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (2007); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 87-140 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 600.435 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12
(LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.20 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3B-15
(2004); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-l (Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (West 2011);
54 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1124 (West Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (2011); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 39-15-1165 (Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-513 (2001); TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-3a-403 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.160 (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 47-2-13 (LexisNexis 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-115 (2003).
121 Some statutes are almost identical to federal law, while others contain greater
variation. Five of the twenty-eight federal-style state provisions are modeled after the 2006
revised federal statute (Alabama, California, Florida, Mississippi, and Oregon), while the
other twenty-three states adopted dilution protection modeled on the 1995 federal statute
(or at least the 1992 Model Bill that contained similar language) and have not revised it in
response to the 2006 changes to federal law (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming). See statutes cited supra note 120. See also Goldstein, supra
note 65, at 236. The ten statutory schemes that do not require fame, see supra note 120,
generally use an older, broader type of dilution protection rather than one of the two
more recent federal models. This older style of dilution protection was included in the
118
119
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status within the fame factors, with one change from the federal
statutes.
In federal law, the reference is only to federal
registration, while at the state level the reference is expanded to
include state-registered status. There is very little state-level case
law under these statutes, and what little does exist does not reflect
that any weight has been placed, in practice, on state registrations
or the lack thereof. Also, state dilution statutes do not contain a
counterpart to subsection 43(c)(6), thus they do not make a state
registration a defensive bar to a state dilution claim brought by
another person using a similar or the same mark.
Thus, even though both federal and state dilution statutes
expand the nature or breadth of available trademark actions122—
sweeping more challenges to third party activity within the range
of the trademark owner’s rights—there is still no comparative
advantage for a state registrant either under federal law or within
the law of the vast majority of states.123
Model Bill from 1964 until 1992. See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 236. The twelve states
whose trademark statutes do not include an action for dilution are Colorado, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
122 Section 43(d) of the Lanham Act is the most recent addition to the panoply of federal
statutory trademark rights. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). It addresses a practice called
“cybersquatting” by providing a federal cause of action to a trademark owner when
another person, with a “bad faith intent to profit” from the owner’s mark, registers,
traffics in, or uses a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to the mark, or, if
the mark is also “famous,” is identical or confusingly similar or dilutive of that mark.
There is no requirement that a cybersquatting plaintiff have registered its mark at the
federal or state level. A defendant’s bad faith intent is determined in part by considering
“the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the [defendant], if any, in the
domain name.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I). I have found no reported section 43(d)
case indicating that courts consider the state-registered status of a mark to be particularly
relevant in evaluating the trademark rights of a plaintiff or a defendant, as compared to
proof of use of the mark in a manner sufficient to create common law rights. There are a
few state cybersquatting statutes, including in California, Hawaii, Louisiana, New York,
and Utah, but only the Hawaii and Utah law apply to marks and connect a state
registration to any advantage for an owner in a cybersquatting action. See CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 17525–17528.5 (West 2008) (protecting personal names of living persons
and deceased personalities); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:300.11–13 & 51:300.21–22 (2003)
(protecting names of living persons as well as nicknames and aliases by which a living
person is commonly known); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 481B-21 to -25 (LEXIS through 20102011 Legis. Sess.) (protecting marks registered and used in Hawaii and names of living
persons); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 146–149 (Supp. 2011) (protecting names of living
persons); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-3a-309 (West through 2010 amendments) (protecting
marks and personal names and providing owners of federal and Utah trademark
registrations with an in rem civil action against domain names in certain circumstances).
123 In light of the remote location of Alaska in comparison to the remainder of the United
States, however, a mark used in Alaska and its most immediate neighbor, Canada, but not
in the contiguous forty-eight United States, would be eligible for federal trademark
protection and yet not be likely to be endowed with recognition in multiple states. So to
the extent that an Alaskan trademark owner believed that its mark would not be famous to
the general consuming public of the United States, see supra note 111 and accompanying
text, or at least some significant geographic portion thereof, but might still be “famous”
within Alaska, the geographic remoteness of Alaska might mean that an Alaskan
registration is actually more valuable in practical terms than it otherwise would appear to
be from the face of the statutes.
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D. Remedies
The remedies available under state statutory law diverge from
the common law in many states, although they do not vary much
from the Lanham Act. The typical remedies for infringement of
common law rights include an injunction124 and, in appropriate
cases, monetary awards in the form of either (1) damage caused to
the plaintiff as a result of the infringement, including lost
profits,125 or (2) defendant’s profits earned as a result of the
infringement,126 and occasionally both.127 Monetary remedies, like
injunctive relief, are not mandatory under the common law;
instead, these remedies fall within the court’s equitable discretion.
Under the common law, recovery of actual damages often requires
proof of actual confusion, although proof of a defendant’s intent
to cause confusion may suffice.128 An award of the defendant’s
profits finds support in one of three rationales: (1) they are a
rough measure of plaintiff’s damages via sales lost to the
infringing defendant; (2) they could award to the plaintiff any
unjust enrichment to the defendant as a result of the
infringement; (3) they represent a measure of deterrence for
willful infringement.129
In many, if not most states, punitive damages are generally
available to punish certain egregious tortious conduct.130 When a
successful common law unfair competition or trademark action
includes proof of serious and intentional misconduct, then
punitive damages may be available. In these states, punitive
damages can be awarded as such, not merely in the guise of an
award of defendant’s profits to the plaintiff under a deterrence
theory. Punitive damages in an unfair competition or trademark
case would be limited by that state’s and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
124 See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 30:1–:16; RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 35.
125 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 30:72–:78; RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 36 cmt.
126 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 30:59–:64; RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 37 cmt.

g.
f.
127 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:73; RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 36 cmt. C, § 37 cmt.
c.
128 MCCARTHY, supra note 3 §§ 30:74–:75.
129 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:59; RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 37 cmt. b.
130 See, e.g., Charles Jacquin et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serrales, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 471 (3d
Cir. 1990) (noting, in a case raising both section 43(a) and Pennsylvania state common
law claims, that the request for punitive damages was governed by Pennsylvania tort law,
which “allows punitive damages only for ‘conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others,’” but not
finding sufficient evidence to support punitive damages where there was “no evidence
that [defendant] willfully set out to copy [plaintiff’s] bottle.”) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). See also MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:96 (citing cases from a number of
states and stating that “[i]n jurisdictions where punitive damages are allowable in tort
cases, they are equally allowable in cases of trademark infringement and unfair
competition.”); RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 36 cmt. n.
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constitutional due process considerations,131 which at this time
continue to allow punitive damages for economically harmful, or
potentially harmful, competitive torts.132
Under the Lanham Act, a court may grant an injunction to
prevent infringement, dilution, or cybersquatting, “according to
the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may
deem reasonable.”133 Monetary remedies for confusion-based
infringement or cybersquatting, or for willful dilution, include—
again subject to “principles of equity”—both the defendant’s
profits and the plaintiff’s damages.134 The court has the power to
award up to three times the amount found to be the plaintiff’s
131 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 425 (2001)
(outlining, in a case where the underlying tort was unfair competition, the due process
considerations that substantively limit state discretion to impose punitive damages, and
listing “(1) the degree of the defendant’s reprehensibility or culpability; (2) the
relationship between the penalty and the harm to the victim caused by the defendant’s
actions; and (3) the sanctions imposed in other cases for comparable misconduct.”
(internal citations omitted)); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996)
(instructing courts to consider, in reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damages, the
“degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,” the “ratio” of the punitive award
“to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff,” and the difference, if any, between “the
punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for
comparable misconduct.”).
132 See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 443 (remanding unfair competition case to appellate
court for de novo review of appropriateness of the amount awarded as punitive damages).
See also JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 918-19 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming
$50,000 punitive damage award under state common law of trademarks, when award for
plaintiff’s lost profits was $125,000, after analyzing preemptive effect of the Lanham Act
and its remedial provisions, and stating that “[a]side from preemption, there is no other
reason to refrain from affirming the jury’s award of punitive damages in this case.”); Big O
Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1376 (10th Cir. 1977)
(approving, under Colorado law, a ratio of 6:1 exemplary to compensatory damages
where common law mark was infringed).
133 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2006).
134 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (“When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) or (d)
of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, shall have been
established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled . . .
subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages
sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.”). Recovery of damages and
profits under the Lanham Act may be limited or eliminated by § 29 for some owners of
registered marks, however, if they failed to provide notice of registered status when using
the registered mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1111. Pleading and pursuing both a state infringement
claim as well as a federal claim, however, may allow a trademark owner limited by § 29 to
nonetheless recover damages or profits under state law. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Lotito, 747
F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1984) (allowing recovery of profits under Rhode Island law and of
attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act).
No small amount of appellate and academic discussion examines the proper
application of “principles of equity” in awarding or withholding profits and damages
under the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark Infringement:
The Role of Bad Faith in Awarding an Accounting of Defendant’s Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 863 (2002); James M. Koelemay, Jr., Monetary Relief for Trademark Infringement Under
the Lanham Act, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 458 (1982) (observing that much of the law of
monetary remedies for trademark infringement under Lanham Act causes of action was
created by reference to common law rather than being dictated by statutory language);
Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968)
(examining the varied rationales for an award of profits under the Lanham Act).
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actual damage, as “compensation and not a penalty,”135 and it can
also adjust the amount of recovery based on the defendant’s
profits if it finds that the actual amount of profit is either
inadequate or excessive.136 The increases and decreases in the
amounts proven by the parties require the exercise of equitable
considerations.137 Attorneys’ fees may also be awarded to the
prevailing party—either plaintiff or defendant—in “exceptional
cases.”138
State statutory remedies range widely, from those matching
the common law to those more closely in tune with the Lanham
Act. With respect to injunctive relief, although all states generally
give courts the power to enjoin infringement, a few states modify
the standard away from the common law and lean somewhat more
in favor of the trademark owner.139 State monetary remedies
follow three basic models, with a few outliers. A number of state
statutes are no more generous than the common law, listing only a
possibility of an award of the registrant’s damages and the
infringer’s profits.140 A second group of states, primarily those
135 Punitive damages are not available for a Lanham Act claim. See, e.g., Getty Petroleum
Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 108–13 (2d Cir. 1988); Zazu Designs v.
L’Oreal S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 1992) (following Getty v. Bartco in holding
punitive damages unavailable under the Lanham Act, and not disturbing the district
court’s finding that punitive damages were available for trademark infringement under
Illinois common law, while at the same time finding the amount awarded by the district
court to be without foundation).
136 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (“In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, according
to the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages,
not exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall find that the amount of the
recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion
enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the
circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute
compensation and not a penalty.”) Mandatory enhancements of these monetary
remedies, as well as mandatory awards of attorneys’ fees, come with a finding that a
counterfeit mark was knowingly and intentionally used. See id., § 1117(b). Plaintiffs may
elect statutory damages over actual damages and profits in cases of counterfeiting or
cybersquatting. See id., § 1117(c)–(d).
137 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
138 Id. The federal courts of appeal do not apply a uniform standard when judging
whether a case presents “exceptional” circumstances justifying an award of attorneys’ fees.
See Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, L.L.C., 626 F.3d 958, 960-62
(7th Cir. 2010) (surveying the varied standards applied in the circuit courts).
139 Texas, for example, makes an injunction mandatory when a state registrant proves
infringement, although it does not mandate the scope of that injunction. See TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 16.26(c) (West 2011) (“If the district court determines that there has
been an infringement, it shall enjoin the act of infringement.”)
140 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1451(B) (2003) (providing basic remedies for most
infringement but adding enhanced remedies related to registered marks used on
unauthorized copies of software); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3314(e) (2005); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 10-1-451(a)–(c) (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:223 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1531 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 1-414(c)–(d) (LexisNexis 2010); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 429.43 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 417.061(2) (West 2001)
(providing basic remedies but also stating that “[t]he court, in its discretion, may enter
judgment in such cases where the court finds that a party committed such wrongful acts
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using one of the more recent versions of the Model Bill as a
guide,141 fall much more in line with the Lanham Act by giving
courts equitable discretion to increase an award of damages or
profits, or both, up to a trebled award.142 Most of the Model Billtype states provide that attorneys’ fees may also be awarded to a
prevailing party where there has been knowing or bad faith

with knowledge or in bad faith or otherwise as according to the circumstances of the
case.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:13 (LexisNexis 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-22-12
(Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1329.66 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
78, § 78-32 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-13 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-6-24
(LexisNexis 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-92.13 (2006). In two of these states, Georgia
and Maine, the statutes also allow a registered trademark owner to elect statutory damages
in lieu of an award of damages and profits. This provides some remedial benefit beyond
the common law, but the amounts are not particularly large: $10,000 and $2,000,
respectively. See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-450; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1531.
141 The Model Trademark Bill remedies provision provides:
Any owner of a mark registered under this Act may proceed by suit to enjoin the
manufacture, use, display or sale of any counterfeits or imitations thereof and
any court of competent jurisdiction may grant injunctions to restrain such
manufacture, use, display or sale as may be by the said court deemed just and
reasonable, and may require the defendants to pay to such owner all profits
derived from and/or all damages suffered by reason of such wrongful
manufacture, use, display or sale; and such court may also order that any such
counterfeits or imitations in the possession or under the control of any
defendant in such case be delivered to an officer of the court, or to the
complainant, to be destroyed. The court, in its discretion, may enter judgment
for an amount not to exceed three times such profits and damages and/or
reasonable attorneys' fees of the prevailing party in such cases where the court
finds the other party committed such wrongful acts with knowledge or in bad
faith or otherwise as according to the circumstances of the case.
2007 Model Bill, supra note 64, § 14.
142 The states closely following the Model Bill are: Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
35-11i(b) (West 2005)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 482-33 (LEXIS through 2010-2011
Legis. Sess.)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-514 (2003)); Illinois (765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 1036/70 (West 2009)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-1-14 (LexisNexis 2006));
Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-215 (Supp. 2008)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.603
(LexisNexis 2008)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110H, § 14 (West Supp.
2011)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.29 (West Supp. 2008) (providing for profits or
damages but yet allowing for trebled profits and damages in bad-faith circumstances));
Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-27 (West through 2009 amendments)); Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-335 (2007)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 600.430 (2007)); New
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.16d (West Supp. 2011)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §
57-3B-16 (2004)); New York (N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-m (Supp. 2011)); Oregon (OR.
REV. STAT. § 647.105 (West 2011)); Pennsylvania (54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1125 (West
Supp. 2011)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1170 (Supp. 2008)); Tennessee
(TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-514 (2001)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-3a-404 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2009)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.150 (West, Westlaw through
2011 Legislation)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-2-14 (LexisNexis 2006)); and
Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-112 (2003)).
Alabama and Florida are more like the Lanham Act than the states following the
Model Bill in that the Model Bill-type statutes limit enhanced damage and profit awards to
cases where wrongful acts were committed with knowledge or bad faith or other similar
circumstances, while Alabama and Florida allow enhanced awards within the court’s more
general equitable discretion. See ALA. CODE § 8-12-18 (West through 2010 amendments);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.141 (West 2010).
Alaska can also be grouped here, since it allows for an award of “punitive damages”
up to three times the award of actual damages and profits. See ALASKA STAT. §
45.50.180(a)–(b) (2008).
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conduct.143 A third group of states is relatively small, but
potentially important. In these states, the statutes make some
awards of damages and profits mandatory.144 In two “outlier”
states, any award of monetary damages requires either proof of
intent to cause confusion or the infringer’s actual knowledge of
the registrant’s mark.145
Realistic opportunities for enhanced monetary awards and
attorneys’ fees are limited. In most states, the plaintiff must prove
bad faith or knowing infringement by the defendant, rather than
the weight of equity (enhanced awards) or exceptionalism
(attorneys’ fees), as with the Lanham Act.146 Moreover, the
143 See sources cited supra note 142. Statutes that create discretionary attorneys’ fee awards
in connection with knowing or bad faith conduct but that allow fees only in favor of a
registrant are found in Hawaii and West Virginia. HAW REV. STAT. § 482-33; W. VA. CODE
§ 47-2-14. Nevada’s attorneys’ fee provision contemplates an award to either party, but it
does not expressly require either bad faith or knowing conduct, or exceptional
circumstances:
2. A court of competent jurisdiction may: (a) Grant injunctions to restrain such
manufacture, use, display or sale as it deems just and reasonable under the
circumstances; (b) Require the defendant to pay to the owner all profits derived
from the wrongful acts of the defendant and all damages suffered by reason of
these acts; (c) Require the defendant to pay to the owner treble damages on all
profits derived from the willful and wrongful acts of the defendant and treble
damages on all damages suffered by reason of these acts. . . . 3. In an action
brought pursuant to this section, the court may award costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 600.430.
As noted above, the Lanham Act allows for an award of attorneys’ fees in
“exceptional” cases, although attorneys’ fees are not generally awarded to the prevailing
party under American common law. See Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling
Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1968). One state’s supreme court has awarded
attorneys’ fees, without statutory authorization in a case of willful infringement under the
state’s unfair competition law. See Red Devil Tools v. Tip Top Brush Co., 236 A.2d 861,
868 (1967) (awarding attorneys’ fees as a measure of equitable relief under the New Jersey
common law of unfair competition).
144 In two states, only a finding of infringement and either the fact of damage or profit
appear to be necessary for the monetary award to be mandated, see CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 14250 (West 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 80-12, 75-1.1, 75-16, 75-16.1 (2007), while
in another the mandatory award arises if bad faith or knowing conduct is proved, see WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 132.033(2)(c) (2009).
145 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-212 (2001) (“any person who shall commit the following
acts [confusion-based infringement under Model Bill language] shall be liable in a civil
action by the registrant for any and all of the remedies provided in § 4-71-214, except that
under this section the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless
the acts have been committed with the intent to cause confusion or mistake or to
deceive”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.26 (West 2011) (“(c) If the district court
determines that there has been an infringement, it shall enjoin the act of infringement
and may (1) require the infringer to pay the registrant all damages resulting from the acts
of infringement and occurring from and after the date two years before the day the suit
was filed; and (2) [remove infringing goods from the infringer’s possession.] (d) A
registrant is entitled to recover damages under Subsection (c)(1) of this section only for
an infringement that occurred during the period of time the infringer had actual
knowledge of the registrant's mark.”).
146 Compare 2007 Model Bill, supra note 64, § 14 (quoted in full, supra note 141) with 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006). In addition, because the awards are permissive rather than
mandatory, in light of the lack of state-law-based guidance and instruction to use the
Lanham Act as a guide, courts deciding cases under these state statutes will likely look to
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registrant in an enhanced damages state or a mandatory damages
state only receives the benefit of the enhanced or mandatory
damages provision if it can prove actual economic damage in the
first instance,147 a matter that is notoriously difficult to do in
If the infringer has also profited from the
practice.148
infringement, then either an enhanced or a mandatory award may
also be a possibility in some states, making the difficulty of proving
actual damage potentially less dire. However, a recent study of
Lanham Act cases demonstrates that demands for increased
damages rarely succeed under the Lanham Act’s discretionary
standard of equity,149 meaning requests for trebled profits or
damages awards under state law may well meet with similar judicial
conservatism.150 In addition, the fact of the infringer’s profit and
its connection to the infringement must still be proven, and
infringers, unfortunately, may be no better at managing profit
than they are at managing their exposure to trademark liability.
My case law research indicates that financial awards are
relatively rare in state trademark litigation, with or without
enhancements.151 Statutorily approved enhancements require bad
faith or knowing infringement in most states, meaning they will be
relatively rare even among cases where a basic award of damages
or profits is deemed appropriate. Nevertheless, the possibility of
such enhancements does exist in a number of states, and the low
cost of obtaining a state registration means that registering its
mark could seem to be a rational option for an intrastate-use-only
the equity-based Lanham Act case law that makes both enhanced and attorneys’ fee
awards very rare.
147 See, e.g., Dennis Miller Pest Control, Inc. v. Denney Miller, Jr. Pest Controls, Inc., 379
S.2d 801, 804–05 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that all remedies are permissive under
Louisiana law and stating that the plaintiff must satisfy the court of the fact that monetary
damage was actually caused by the defendant’s infringement or the court will deny a
monetary award even when the defendant is found liable for infringement and is being
enjoined).
148 A study of reported Lanham Act cases between 1947 and 2005 indicated that 51% of
cases filed resulted in a finding of infringement, while monetary damages were awarded in
only 5.5% of cases filed. Port, supra note 71, at 622.
149 See id. at 620, 624–25. Demands for treble damages were not rare in the later years of
Professor Port’s 1947–2005 study, but very few such demands were successful. From 1996–
2005, for example, his study revealed 142 demands for trebled damages, only seventeen of
which were granted. Id. at 620. Between 1947 and 1995, only eleven demands for treble
damages were granted in the reported cases. Id.
150 As the caselaw demonstrates, and commenters have observed, much of the law
governing remedies under the Lanham Act arises from principles developed over time in
the common law of trademarks. See, e.g., Koelemay, supra note 134. Because most state
statutes are permissive with respect to monetary remedies and because courts applying the
statutes will be guided by Lanham Act case law in most cases, see supra note 146, state
monetary remedies are highly unlikely to vary in reality from those that would be available
under either the Lanham Act or the common law.
151 I did not engage in a rigid, reliable, empirical study of awards. I make this statement
based on my reading of numerous cases in doing the research for this Article.
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trademark owner to exercise in the relevant states. Even if those
owners might not actually litigate a case through to the damages
phase, the settlement value of a case where trebling or attorneys’
fee awards are possible or where monetary awards are couched in
mandatory terms is certainly higher than a case where it is not.
The possibility of a punitive damage award for intentional
infringement of a common law mark, however, means that the
owner of a state registration is not necessarily in a better position
than a common law owner, even if that owner engages in only
intrastate use of its mark.152 Some potential benefit does accrue to
a state registrant where remedies are enhanced, but only if the
ultimate infringer causes actual damage or earns measurable
profit and the infringer’s conduct falls somewhere between the
bad faith or knowing standard required under many state statutes
but not reaching the egregious standard needed to support
punitive damages. And for owners eligible for federal protection,
whether that protection is registered or unregistered, the
enhanced remedies available under the Lanham Act’s potentially
more generous standards153 make reliance on state remedial
provisions unnecessary.154
IV. THE COSTS & BENEFITS OF STATE TRADEMARK REGISTRATIONS
In Part IV, I explore the costs and benefits of state trademark
registrations beyond their value to the owner in litigation. The
analysis in Part III of evidentiary or procedural effects, geographic
scope of rights, nature and breadth of the cause of action, and
remedies under state statutory law explains how trademark owners
obtain virtually no substantive or remedial benefit in litigation by
152 In some states, awards of attorneys’ fees may also be available in a common law
infringement case, at least if the case is brought as a declaratory judgment. See, e.g.,
Horseshoe Bay Resort Sales Co. v. Lake Lyndon B. Johnson Improvement Corp., 53
S.W.3d 799, 813 (Tex. App. 2001) (approving use of declaratory judgment procedure, and
subsequent fee award under Texas declaratory judgment statute, in a case brought by
plaintiff trademark owner seeking a declaration that a mark was valid and owned by
plaintiff, and that defendant’s use constituted dilution). Moreover, in states that include
trademark infringement within the scope of the state’s unfair trade practice act, see supra
note 19, attorneys’ fees may be available when a common law mark owner seeks
protection under the act.
153 As noted above, the Lanham Act allows for enhancements within the equitable
discretion of the court, while state statutes generally expressly restrict enhanced awards to
cases of bad faith or intentional infringement.
154 Lanham Act claimants, like state registrants, can also always add a state common law
claim to the complaint to add a demand for punitive damages in appropriate cases. See,
e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 445 (2001); Getty
Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 878 F.2d 650, 657 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming an
award of punitive damages under New York common law of unfair competition even
through punitive damages were affirmed to be unavailable under the plaintiff’s alsosuccessful Lanham Act claim).
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virtue of the vast majority of state registrations. Even following a
demonstration that state registrations are, in most states, relatively
powerless, it does not necessarily follow that such registrations
should be abolished. The other effects of state registrations
deserve consideration because significant non-litigation benefits of
state registration systems, if any exist, would provide reasons not to
eliminate those systems.155 Similarly, a range of harms, if found,
would enhance the argument for abolition. I have subdivided the
effects of state registrations into two rough (and admittedly
sometimes overlapping) categories: private effects (individual
owners and would-be market entrants) and public effects (systemic
effects and economic considerations).
A. Private Effects
1. Negotiations and New Market Entrants
A state registration could add weight, at least rhetorically, to a
registrant’s claim of trademark ownership, which could be helpful
in negotiating with an accused infringer or with a purchaser of the
mark or the registrant’s business. The McCarthy treatise concurs
with the potential rhetorical weight of a state trademark
registration. It hypothesizes that a state registration might “serve
as a valuable card” in negotiations with other users or potential
users of the mark, such as alleged infringers or prospective
purchasers of the trademark.156 Yet I do not think there is much
practical value in this role for a state registration, unless the
negotiations relate to a high-value state registration or unless (in a
low-value state) the other party to the negotiations is legally

It has not escaped my attention that INTA, an organization full of sophisticated
trademark counsel and trademark owners, is the organization responsible for the weak
substantive effect of a state trademark registration in the many states closely following the
Model Bill. Certainly the leaders of INTA once thought, and continue to think, that there
is some systemic benefit—or at least benefit to INTA members—in having weak state
registration systems. One reason for the weakness of these systems is, of course, the desire
to ensure that state registration schemes do not interfere with the intent of the Lanham
Act in providing relatively uniform rights to federal registrants. But this concern is
addressed by the current limited preemption within the Lanham Act and would be even
more completely addressed by totally eliminating state registrations instead of
perpetuating weak systems. Perhaps INTA’s membership simply realizes the practical
reality of the situation: states may be unlikely to eliminate state trademark registrations
entirely, since most states have more than one hundred years of history with them.
INTA’s interest may be in providing guidance to state governments that curbs the
potential for state adoption of strange or impractical trademark laws. INTA’s members
will not likely rely on state-registered rights and will generally pursue federal registration,
so the weakness of Model Bill rights does not pose a potential harm for them.
156 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 22.1 (noting that a state registration might “serve as
a valuable card” in negotiating with either an alleged infringer or a prospective purchaser
of the trademark rights).
155
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unsophisticated and not represented by trademark-savvy
counsel.157 My analysis above regarding civil litigation under state
statutory law in a high-value state already accounts for the former
negotiation value, since the enforceable scope of rights in
litigation is what provides the high-value registration with
negotiation value. And the latter negotiation value, namely in a
negotiation with an unsophisticated or inexperienced party in
connection with a low-value registration, is really a double-edged
sword. I submit to the readers of this article an empirically
untested (and likely untestable) hypothesis that arises from
practice experience and the case law research for this article: the
holder of a state registration is just as likely to be the legally
unsophisticated party over-relying on a low-value registration as it
is to be negotiating with such an unsophisticated party. If the
holder is the party over-relying, the registration may well hold up a
successful deal rather than add value to it.
Moreover, as a matter of policy, this “stamp of approval” type
of effect can be damaging to the third parties against whom the
registration is asserted. The existence and assertion of weak—but
technically official—state-registered rights can represent a costincreasing strategy on the part of the owner of the registration.158
The registration can increase a potential competitor’s costs
because it may believe that it must pursue an alternative mark.159
The citation of a state registration number or the production of a
copy of a registration certificate likely looks quite impressive,
particularly in comparison to a simple claim of “I used it first.”
This potentially damaging effect of a state trademark registration
may be of particular concern when a new market entrant is

Paul D. Supnik, Checkmarks, L.A. LAWYER., May 2000, at 40, 42 n.2 (observing that a
state registration is “possibly advantageous in a court proceeding, especially with less
sophisticated counsel”).
158 The fact that state-registered rights have resulted in so few successful and reported
decisions makes them even more unpredictable than federally registered rights. This
unpredictability raises the cost to the potential user beyond that of a federal registration,
since available case law makes those rights somewhat clearer although still subject to close
factual and legal analysis. Similarly, Kenneth Port characterizes an intent-to-use
application as a cost-increasing predatory strategy that “increases would-be competitors’
costs because these competitors think they must find an alternative trademark if the
predator has registered [in context, this may actually refer to applications rather than
registrations] the same or a similar mark for the same or similar goods,” and he cites
dilution liability as an even more significant cost-increasing strategy because its scope is
both broad and somewhat unpredictable. See Port, supra note 71, at 604–05.
159 Given the breadth of trademark rights, which extend beyond pure competition into
any use that might cause confusion, mistake or deception as to source, sponsorship, or
affiliation, the use of “competitor” here is actually too narrow. Any potential user of the
same or a similar mark must carefully analyze the registration, particularly the scope of
goods or services listed, and compare it to the potential user’s own planned offering of
goods or services.
157
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concerned.160 The new market entrant may refrain from engaging
in commercial activities that are actually entirely acceptable under
state trademark law because it misunderstands the much weaker
power of a state registration in comparison to a federal one. Or it
might well understand its actual rights but be incapable of
absorbing the potential cost of litigation.161 Depending on how far
down the road the competitor or market entrant is in the process
of selecting its own mark, a change of plan could be costly indeed.
Of course the activities of legally unsophisticated or relatively less
financially secure parties may be chilled by a variety of
substantively weak, yet seemingly powerful, claims made by
overzealous trademark owners. A state registration is certainly not
the only source of fodder for such claims. I think it unwise,
however, for state governments to be in the business of providing
ammunition for weak substantive claims that have the potential to
produce an anticompetitive chilling effect.
Even more costly for a would-be market entrant, as well as for
the registration’s owner, is state-registration-based trademark
litigation that would not have been brought, or would have been
terminated earlier, if the parties’ respective rights had been better
understood. The indeterminacy of state trademark rights (or any
trademark rights, for that matter) can lead to the wasteful outlay
of private resources in pursuing or defending against trademark
litigation. Trademark litigation can be remarkably costly, even
when it is terminated at the end of discovery. A 2011 report issued
by the American Intellectual Property Law Association indicates
160 The damaging effect of unwarranted trademark claims has guided the Supreme Court
in the past. The Court relied in large part on concerns related to anticompetitive claims
of infringement in denying trademark protection for product design that has not been
proven to have acquired distinctiveness. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.,
529 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2000) (stating that “[c]onsumers should not be deprived of the
benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product
design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new
entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness,” and “Competition is deterred . . .
not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit, and given the
unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based
upon alleged inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.”)
161 See, e.g., Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, L.L.C., 626 F.3d 958,
962–63 (7th Cir. 2010):
A . . . concern [making an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party
potentially appropriate] is the potential for business to use Lanham Act
litigation for strategic purposes–not to obtain a judgment or defeat a claim but
to obtain a competitive advantage independent of the outcome of the case by
piling litigation costs on a competitor. . . . The owner of a trademark might
bring a Lanham Act suit against a new entrant into his market, alleging
trademark infringement but really just hoping to drive out the entrant by
imposing heavy litigation costs on him. . . . Trademark suits, like much other
commercial litigation, often are characterized by firms’ desire to heap costs on
their rivals, imposing marketplace losses out of proportion to the legal merits.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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that the median litigation cost for a trademark litigation suit with
less than one million dollars at risk is around $200,000 through
the end of discovery, and around $350,000 to the conclusion of
the dispute, inclusive of all costs.162 The reported median
litigation cost rises, as might be expected, with the amount that is
perceived to be at risk.163 Even if these figures are for Lanham Act
litigation only, and state-law-based litigation is somewhat lower in
cost than federal litigation (which it might or might not be), weak
or poorly understood state-registered trademark rights are an
inappropriate trigger for such high litigation costs.
2. Searching
Arguably, a state registration can also perform a valuable
service to third parties because it provides a means for a
trademark owner’s claim of ownership to be found when a person
engages in a clearance search for a new trademark of interest.164 I
agree that a state registration does remain a relatively cheap way
for a trademark owner to ensure that a sophisticated trademark
searcher will encounter a claim of rights during the search
process. The reality of current domestic search practice in
comparison to just ten years ago, however, is that state trademark
registers are less important than they once were.
State registers do remain relevant, but in a relative sense the
search-related value of a state trademark registration has declined.
A vast amount of information about common law uses, including
limited-area uses, of marks is readily available on the internet by
the simple use of a search engine. Even small businesses selling
either services or goods often have a web presence today, either
through a low-cost independent website or through a variety of
aggregating sources (including Etsy, eBay, LinkedIn, Facebook,
and the like). That web presence makes those small trademark
users visible in a way that just simply did not exist until recently.
The data searching methods used by commercial trademark
search companies also rely on a wide array of database sources
from which information about unregistered marks may be
obtained. It is true that a sophisticated searcher is almost certain
162 AIPLA REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 35 (2011).
163 Id.
164 See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 22.1 (noting that a

registration “may have a valuable
defensive effect in that [it is] on the public record and will easily be found by others who
have a nationwide search made. Finding such a state registration may deter others from
adopting and using a similar mark.”); see also Milton B. Seasonwein, The Effect of State
Trademark Registration, 61 TRADEMARK REP. 457, 463 (1971) (“[T]he state registration is
subordinate to the federal registration and in most states its only advantage is that the
registrant has made a public record of its claim to ownership of the trademark.”).
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to encounter a relevant state trademark registration, since
commercial trademark searches utilize the state registers as
important sources of information. But because state trademark
registers are not easily searchable by individuals not using a
commercial search product or service,165 state registration does not
significantly increase the likelihood that less-sophisticated parties
will be put on actual notice of the claim, even when those lesssophisticated parties go so far as to search for similar trademarks.
The persons most likely to encounter a state trademark
registration in the process of reviewing a commercial trademark
clearance search are also the persons most likely to be aware that
state trademark registrations have, in most states, no more power
than a common law use. As a result, they are unlikely to place any
greater weight on a similar state-registered mark than they would
on a similar common law mark, which would also be revealed in
the search. The potential unpredictability arising from both stateto-state variation and the paucity of case law interpreting and
applying state trademark statutes, however, raises risk to would-be
users, thus raising the cost of market entry.166
3. Registrant “Peace of Mind”
Historically, there was a significant lag of time between the
date of first use of a mark and the effective date of the nationwide
rights provided by a registration based on that use. Much of the
time delay resulted from both the examination process performed
federally, while the remainder arose from the rest of the federal
registration process that requires publication of the mark and a
waiting period in which interested third parties can file an
opposition to the registration of the mark. In order to increase
security, or at least perceived security in their trademark rights,
trademark owners could file applications for both state and
federal registration on the same day. Because state applications
were not examined as closely by state authorities, compared to
federal examination,167 and because state applications did not
require publication and notice, the state registration would
inevitably issue before the federal registration, even when no
objections to the registration were raised by the federal trademark
office or third parties. The earlier issue date for the state

Two commonly used search providers are CTCorsearch, see CORSEARCH,
https://www.ctcorsearch.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2011), and Thomson CompuMark, see
THOMPSON COMPUMARK, http://compumark.thomson.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
166 See Port, supra note 71, at 604–05.
167 See infra Part IV.B.2.
165
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registration created an incentive to pursue state registration in
addition to federal registration. Today, however, modifications to
the federal regime related to intent-to-use applications168—
wherein federal constructive use, and thus priority, arises from the
date of application and not the date of registration,169 and a
federal application can be filed before the mark is used—mean
that the simultaneous filing of both state and federal applications
no longer has the appearance of securing the owner’s rights as of
an earlier date.
One continuation or vestige of this earlier practice of
simultaneous filing may be that, even for trademark owners not
seeking federal registration, a state registration certificate creates
some degree of “peace of mind” for a trademark owner who wants
something relatively tangible to possess in relation to a claim of
trademark rights. For some, a common law claim of ownership
may be unsatisfying. The McCarthy treatise may echo the
potential peace of mind as the “psychologically soothing effect” of
a state registration.170 While I agree that this is one possible effect
of a state registration, I would disagree that it is a benefit. I think
the psychologically soothing effect may actually be costly for the
owner.
Private harm can accrue to legally unsophisticated trademark
owners who obtain, and then rely on, state registrations. For
instance, in one of the vast majority of states where a registrant
obtains no greater enforceable right than a common law user
under state law, the unsophisticated registrant may suffer the
small, but still real, economic harm of having paid a registration
fee to the state in order to obtain the registration, in addition to
the noneconomic harm of the time and energy spent pursuing a
low-value registration.171 These registrants may or may not have
paid a local attorney to file the application and communicate with
the state trademark authority; if they did so, their economic harm
A low-value registration, from the
will be even greater.172
registrant’s perspective, represents a waste of private resources.
Even when the trademark user in question engages in solely
intrastate commerce, pursuing such a registration is a waste of

See supra Part II.B.4.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 22:1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See, e.g., AIPLA REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 28 (2011) (reporting a median
charge of $700 for the preparation and filing of a federal application, exclusive of any
clearance or search costs and of any additional time spent in prosecution).
168
169
170
171
172
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resources in comparison to relying on common law protection.173
If a state registrant in any state is “psychologically sooth[ed],”
then that person may not explore the possibility of federal
registration. For owners who engage in interstate use within the
scope of the federal registration provisions, this psychological
effect creates real costs. The owner suffers a lost opportunity, the
value of which would vary depending on future events. If a mark
owner, relying on the state registration that appears to have more
value than it does, unwittingly passes up the option to obtain a
federal registration, it foregoes, for example, the ability to claim
nationwide priority. That owner may have to suffer the entry into
the market of a remote junior user, whose valid acquisition of
common law rights may foreclose expansion by the state
registrant. Worse, a subsequent federal registrant of the same or a
similar mark, whether junior or senior in priority in the nation as
a whole, may be able to freeze the owner’s use of its mark within a
relatively small geographic area or market position.174
B. Public Effects
1. Avoiding Federal Clutter
A potentially beneficial effect of state registration systems may
be that the option of state registration could keep some potential
registrants from pursuing federal registration.175 For an individual
registrant whose interstate use would provide the basis of a federal
registration, I characterize this hypothetical effect as a private
173 In a survey done almost twenty years ago, when state practices were generally similar to
those in place today, state trademark offices did not search all name-related registrations
or filings made at a state level (such as registered corporate names and trade names)
when examining a trademark application. See Leonard D. DuBoff, What’s in a Name: The
Interplay Between the Federal and [State] Trademark Registries and State Business Registries, 6
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 15, 27 (1993). This adds, perhaps, to the confusion of a legally
unsophisticated owner who may over-rely on rights that are not actually created by state
registration in any event.
174 See, e.g., Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968) (freezing
Illinois state registrant’s rights in the market area of Mattoon, Illinois as a result of later
federal registration of the BURGER KING mark by an earlier remote common law user).
175 I thank Professor Irene Calboli for emphasizing this potentially beneficial effect in
commenting on my thesis that state registrations should be abolished. Both she and I are,
I admit, taking this effect as a distinct possibility without having any specific evidence to
support the hypothesis that some state registrants do not also pursue federal registration,
or that they knowingly choose state over federal registration simply because the state
option is available. I think this could be true, however, because of the cost-sensitivity of
some very small business owners, a sensitivity I encountered in private practice when
counseling business owners on the selection and protection of their trademarks. I do not
recall any client choosing state protection when the mark could be cleared for a federal
application, but I do recall discussing the relative merits of state and federal protection in
connection with questions over the difference in application fees charged at the state and
federal levels.
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harm.176 But this self-selection, if it actually occurs, could
theoretically benefit the trademark system as a whole through its
collective effect on individual third parties later choosing marks
for remote, geographically limited uses.177 When a trademark
owner with interstate use but no particular national aspirations
opts out of applying for federal registration, the federal register
stays less “cluttered.” Under this logic, the existence of state
registers avoids unnecessary clutter on the federal register, which
in turn—because it avoids the nationwide constructive use and
priority provided by a federal registration—leaves third parties in
other, remote areas of the country free to use the same or a
similar mark as long as they do not expand into previously
occupied markets.
In light of the reality of trademark search practice today, I
find this theory only somewhat persuasive. A person engaged in a
trademark search will find the state registration, and if the
registration conflicts with the desired mark, the mark becomes offlimits for the searcher’s use. Persons who perform actual searches
are, generally speaking, interested in widely available marks, not
just marks narrowly available in remote geographic areas.
Moreover, as a result of the good faith requirement for the
common law prior user defense,178 the person who performs the
search that reveals the state registration may need to avoid the
mark even if that person desires to make only a remote,
geographically limited use. Under the dominant view of the prior
use defense, the searcher, with the actual knowledge gained as a
result of finding a state registration, will likely no longer be found
to have acted in good faith if it begins to use the mark, even in a
remote area. If the state registrant expands its use in a way that
ultimately conflicts geographically with a junior user that had
knowledge of the registration, that junior user will have to give
way. The persons who are freed to adopt and use a mark, when a
state registration rather than a federal registration exists for a
desired mark, are those persons who do not engage in any
searching before choosing a mark or who only engage in a cursory
See supra Part IV.A.3.
Even if state trademark registrations do decrease participation in the federal system,
this effect is not necessarily positive as a policy matter—like many things, it depends on
one’s perspective. The legislative history of the Lanham Act states that one asserted
purpose of the Act was to make federal registration more appealing specifically in order to
increase reliance upon it—thus bringing more marks into the visible, searchable federal
register and making the geographic scope of rights in those marks both clearer and
broader. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1277.
See also Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985).
178 See supra Part II.B.3.
176
177
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search of the federal register. For these people, the undiscovered
state registration is no more consequential than an undiscovered
state common law use.
2. State Administrative Cost
A public effect that is economic in nature relates to the cost
of operating state registration systems. State systems are funded by
registration fees that are laughably low. Seventeen states charge an
application fee of $30 or less,179 and twenty-two charge $50.180 Only
five states charge $100 or more, with the highest fees in Ohio and
South Dakota at $125.181 A comparison between these fees and
those charged by the federal trademark office provides an
indication that either significant substantive examination is not
taking place at the state level, in most instances, or that the state
trademark offices rely on other sources of funding to stay in
operation, or both.182 For example, the least expensive filing
option at the federal trademark office is a streamlined application
that largely eliminates the time an examiner might spend in
dealing with a non-standard description of goods and services.
That option currently costs $275. Part of that fee covers expenses
not borne by state offices (such as those involved in publishing
applications and operating the federal office’s online search

179 The seventeen states charging $30 or less are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. All of the fees discussed here
also appear in the appendix and were last confirmed on Oct. 28, 2011 by means of the
website operated by the relevant state authority. The United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) maintains a list of those websites. State Trademark Information Links,
USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/State_Trademark_Links.jsp (last
visited Oct. 28, 2011).
Most states, as well as the USPTO, charge trademark fees not by individual
application, but by the number of classes of goods or services contained in the
application. Three states buck this practice: Maine and North Dakota charge a lower fee
for each additional class, while West Virginia’s basic filing fee includes two classes. Each of
the fees discussed above, except for West Virginia, is the fee for a single-class application.
States also charge a fee to renew a registration at the end of its term. The renewal fee is
the same as the application fee in thirty-three states, while it is lower in sixteen states and
higher in one.
180 Kansas charges $40, while the states charging $50 are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado (see
infra note 187), Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia. Mississippi,
interestingly, charges $50 to resident applicants and $60 to nonresident applicants.
181 Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wyoming charge $100 or more. The
remaining five states, California, Florida, Maine, North Carolina, and Washington, charge
between $55 and $87.50.
182 See Travers, supra note 82, at 40 (explaining that one reason the Colorado Secretary of
State instigated a revision of the Colorado registration laws, see supra text accompanying
notes 81–82, was that the need for multiple employees to screen trademark applications in
order to perform substantive examination would require an increase in application fees in
order to cover the costs of the system).
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tools), but even if we imagine that half of the fee is unrelated to
the examination process, states are surely still losing money on
their trademark registration systems.183
Both possibilities that explain the low state fees are harmful.
Registrations issued without proper examination harm the parties
relying on them, including both the owner and third parties who
discover the registration or are threatened with it and whose
lawful activities could be chilled. The harm of an unexamined
registration to both owners and potential market entrants is even
greater than the already-discussed harms to these persons when a
low-value registration is simply misunderstood, since lack of
examination could easily result in registrations for wholly invalid
marks.184
Registrations that are properly examined, but at a cost
exceeding that paid by the registrants, force the taxpaying public
to bear a portion of the cost of examination with no benefit from
those registrations returning to the public. Trademark policy
includes consumer protection within its scope, but no additional
consumer protection accrues from a registered mark compared to
a common law mark. The fees received by the states in
connection with state registrations do not appear capable of fully
compensating the states for out-of-pocket costs, and the resulting
state registrations do not create a greater public good that justifies
the added economic expense charged to public funds.
V. RECOMMENDATION TO ABOLISH CURRENT SYSTEMS
My examination of the effect of state registrations both inside
litigation and out, weighing costs and benefits, both public and
private, leads me to the conclusion that all states should abolish
their registration systems. In advocating for abolition of current
state registration systems, reasonable questions arise. One is
whether express federal preemption of state registration schemes
would be preferable to a patchwork period of state-by-state
legislative action.185 The other, more important question is

State trademark applications generally continue to be filed in paper form, and as
noted above, forty states charge $50 or less for each filing. The USPTO’s current
schedule of fees reflects that it assesses a $50 surcharge for a paper filing of an application
versus an otherwise-identical electronic filing. In another way of thinking about these
fees, the USPTO’s fee simply for handling paper, not for any substantive work, is $50.
184 In addition, improperly examined registrations, if they do result in the registration of
an invalid mark, could harm the public if the resources of law-enforcement agencies are
called upon in an anti-counterfeiting effort for an invalid mark.
185 Professor John Cross recently proposed that Congress expressly preempt most
substantive state-law trademark rights, both common law and statutory, partially because
of the lack of full uniformity that state rights inject into U.S. trademark law. See Cross,
183
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whether the advantages of abolishing state systems either by
preemption or by state legislative action will outweigh the costs of
eliminating the search-related benefits created by state
registrations.186
One additional suggestion, related to the concern I raise in
Part IV.B.2 regarding the economic drain on public funds created
by state registration systems, is an increase in application fees,
rather than abolition of the system. I agree that if there is
substantive examination taking place, states should at least charge
a fee that covers all of the state’s costs. I do not favor this
approach as a moderate fix to one of the issues I have identified,
however, for two reasons. First, I think such states are actually few
in number, with the greater number of states performing little to
no serious substantive examination.187 Second, as explained above,
I think that even properly examined but low-value registrations are
harmful.188 For these reasons, I advocate that state legislatures
simply abolish their current systems.
I have considered the possibility of express statutory
preemption, which would require revision of the Lanham Act but
not state-by-state legislative action, but I find it less appealing than
state-level abolition. Even if enough members of Congress were
convinced of the need to preempt state registration schemes
purporting to grant rights to marks used in interstate commerce,
on the basis that such registrations conflict with the federal
scheme, Congress could not preempt state registration schemes as
applied to intrastate-only marks. Preemption, then, would leave

supra note 1.
186 A third question might be whether, in today’s economic environment, abolishing state
registration systems might have a negative impact on state budgets. As explained in Part
IV.B. above, the budgetary impact of abolition should either be neutral or, more likely,
positive.
187 See, e.g., Travers, supra note 82, at 40 (explaining that lack of actual examination
prompted Colorado to terminate a system purporting to examine all trademark
applications). In Colorado, the then-Secretary of State’s conclusion was that proper state
examination would require an increase in fees, which would in turn impair the limited
value of a state system as a means of giving public notice of trademark claims. See id.
It is difficult to know exactly what takes place inside the relevant office in each state
after a trademark application is filed. I note here, however, that examination is statutorily
required in only a minority of states. Even when it is required, the standard for
registration being enforced does not typically require any inquiry into the question of
whether a similar state corporate name or trade name has previously been registered in
that state or whether a similar and conflicting mark has previously been registered
federally.
188 Moreover, fee increases significant enough to create user-funded state registration
systems would likely mean that state fees would rise to the point where cost-motivated state
registrants, if any, see supra note 175, would move into the federal registration system. As
noted earlier, while foregoing federal registration risks opportunity costs for an individual
owner, it might help keep the federal register less cluttered, which could be viewed as a
systemic benefit, albeit a limited one. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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state registration schemes in place, though it would limit them in
scope. This would not sufficiently address the negative effects of
the state registrations that would continue to be granted; however,
those registrations would be fewer in number, and the aggregate
cost would diminish accordingly.
State legislatures considering my recommendation to abolish
their trademark registration systems should recall two points
emphasized throughout this Article: (1) the common law provides
an owner, at no up-front charge, protection for a trademark in the
area of use and reputation; and (2) the nature of the infringement
or dilution cause of action under statutory law is no broader than
that of the common law. The only difference between statutory
and common law outside the “high-value” states arises in the
available remedies, and even then only in some states and in
certain limited circumstances. In states with enhanced remedies,
the discretionary nature of the remedies and the requirement of
knowledge or bad faith will mean that most trademark owners,
even those who litigate a case through to the remedies stage, will
not realize a difference in statutory litigation compared to the
common law. Persons who may feel the effect or difference
created by a state registration system are the unsophisticated,
financially weak, or simply risk-averse market entrants who absorb
the cost of low-value and poorly examined trademark rights, as
well as the public coffers that absorb the economic cost of state
registration systems.
State legislatures can be presented, by INTA or possibly
others, with a pro-business argument for state trademark
registration systems on the basis that trademarks generally are probusiness because they protect a business’s investment in its
goodwill. Taking trademarks as being business-favorable, one can
even argue for the value of state registrations as a supplement to
federal registrations by pointing to the lower cost of a state
registration as being beneficial to smaller businesses—the oftromanticized “mom and pop” shops of “main street” or “small
town America.” While I would agree that registration-related
benefits such as constructive use and notice can be, but are not
uniformly, “pro-business” at the federal level, I argue emphatically
that at the state level, the previously unexamined consequences of
the current systems are potentially more damaging than beneficial
where those same small businesses are concerned.
Transitional concerns about eliminating any real or perceived
additional rights created by current registration systems should
not stop a legislature from proceeding to abolish a state’s
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registration system. The transition could be addressed by simply
allowing no new state registrations, but retaining any existing
rights, for a period of either five or ten years, depending on the
current term of registration in the state.189 This transitional period
would allow current registrations to expire without removing any
actual benefits during the life of the registration.190 At the end of
the five- or ten-year period, the abolition of the entire system
would become effective. As explained in Part IV.A.2, the loss of
search-related benefits should not give a legislature pause, since
modern search practices and ever-expanding technological
capabilities have lowered the relative search value of a state
registration.
If state legislatures cannot “stomach” complete abolition of
their registration systems, the current systems could instead be
renamed and reconfigured to somewhat resemble the system in
Colorado, where the state now operates a notice of claim system,
not a registration system.191 Under this alternative, however, I
would like to see states go beyond the Colorado model to create
an interconnected, easily searchable database that would allow all
participating states to share the cost of administering the system
and would allow greater practical benefits to arise. A notice-ofclaim system with a multistate consolidated database having public
search capability could enhance the benefits that state registration
systems currently provide by offering broader search coverage and
a potentially more effective means of providing actual notice of a
trademark claim. Such a system would avoid much of the

189 Twenty-six states grant registrations for a five-year term, while twenty-three states grant
a ten-year term. As noted in the appendix, Texas will move from a ten-year term to a fiveyear term in September 2012. One state grants a four-year registration and would thus
have a four-year transition period.
190 I do not think that state legislatures should be concerned about a takings claim based
on abolition of the entire state registration system as set forth in this Article, although it is
possible to predicate an appropriate takings claim based on the taking of intellectual
property rights, see, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002–04 (1984)
(analyzing claim of trade secret rights in data and concluding that such “intangible
property rights protected by state law” were properly within the protective scope of the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment). I hold this view even as applied to the few states
where I find that the statutory scheme creates value for the registrant. See supra Part III.B.
Full explanation of my reasoning exceeds the scope of this Article, but I provide its
outline here: in trademark law the underlying intangible right arises from the common
law and equitable principles of unfair competition; state statutory rights merely recognize
and in some states procedurally and remedially enhance those rights; state statutory rights
have always been time-limited, removing any permanence of those rights that are granted
or enhanced by statute; and this proposal for abolition provides that each existing
registration and any related rights will remain fully effective and unaltered—substantively,
procedurally, and remedially—for the remainder of its term.
191 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (briefly explaining Colorado’s institution
of a “statement of trademark registration” that does not create rights beyond the common
law).
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confusion and confusion-related harms caused by current systems,
although it would not eliminate them.
A consolidated, jointly administered notice-of-claim system, as
I envision it, would consist of one database publicly available for
searching via the internet. The database would be populated by
trademark claims transmitted by state trademark administrators
following minimal review of submissions made at the state level.
This system need not increase costs to the registrant or state. In
fact, even if the states retained the same fees being charged today,
the net public cost in all states should decrease somewhat as a
result of cost-sharing with respect to maintaining the consolidated
database. The net cost to the state should decrease significantly in
states that currently conduct substantive examination of
applications. A ten-year transition period would suffice. Any
renewal application during the ten-year transition would be
treated as a submission of a notice of claim, such that at the end of
the ten-year period, all prior registrations would have been either
abandoned or converted.192
VI. CONCLUSION
Abolishing state registration systems will benefit the public,
the system, and even private owners. The effect on state finances
may be small in some states, but it should be positive in most and
neutral in the rest. Abolition will provide added clarity for
trademark owners and market entrants by simplifying the web of
rights. Simplified rights would decrease the private costs imposed
by state registrations without significantly diminishing the
substantive rights actually available to trademark owners. Modern
search practices rely so little on state trademark registers that
persons performing clearance searches will feel little effect from
abolition.
Eliminating state registrations would diminish,
192 States have more than one option with respect to statutory rights if they move to a
notice-of-claim system. States could retain the statutory benefits currently available to
registrants but provide them instead to registered claimants. Those benefits might
include, like current statutes, potentially enhanced remedies in cases of bad faith
infringement. States whose counterfeiting statutes currently only cover state-registered
marks rather than common law marks could either eliminate any registration-type
requirement for access to a counterfeiting claim and remedy, or states could modestly
revise the affected statutes to require prior submission of a notice of claim before a
trademark owner could bring a civil claim for counterfeiting. States using a notice-ofclaim system might also wish to require that a notice be on file before a trademark owner
may engage the assistance of law enforcement in the pursuit of suspected counterfeiters,
or before a criminal action could be brought in connection with the counterfeiting
activity. On the other hand, states could revoke all statutorily enhanced private rights and
remedies and go the direction of Colorado, where the “statement of trademark
registration” serves only as a means of providing actual notice to junior users and does not
connect to a statutory cause of action for infringement or dilution.
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although it would not entirely avoid, the risk of harm to market
entrants through overreaching by owners of federally unregistered
rights. Moreover, abolition would avert the costs suffered by
individual owners who overestimate and thus improperly rely on
impotent state registrations.
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